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Abstract
Essays on Employment Growth, Wage Discrimination, and Marijuana Legalization
Candon R. Johnson
The opening chapter covers the impact of the Olympic Games on employment growth.
The Olympics Games stand as the largest sporting event in the world. The Games include
approximately 200 countries during the Summer Olympic Games and 90 countries competing
in the Winter Games, each occurring once every four years. Potential host cities ercely
compete to host the games under the guise of economic prosperity. Event promoters claim
substantial economic benets, such as employment growth, to be had from hosting these
costly games. This paper examines the impacts of the Olympic Games on employment growth
rates using a synthetic control approach. Results show transitory increases in employment
growth rates following a county being awarded the Olympic Games in Fulton County, GA
and Salt Lake County, UT. A decrease in employment growth rate appears in Los Angeles
County, CA due to being awarded the 1984 Summer Olympic Games. Results suggest that
potential hosts should proceed with caution when considering hosting the Olympic Games.
Chapter two investigates the prominence of wage discrimination in the National Basket-
ball Association (NBA) using free agent signings from 2011-2017. Free agent signings allow
us to better capture the determinants of players' wages, a limitation of the previous NBA
wage discrimination literature. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and weighted linear
regression models, we nd that black athletes are paid signicantly less than their counter-
parts. In addition, weighted quantile regressions show evidence of the presence of consumer
discrimination in the league. This is observed through the result that black players with
high audience visibility experience a larger racial wage gap; moreover, this gap is positively
related to the share of white population of the MSA where the player is employed.
In the nal chapter, I explore the impact of legalization of marijuana on risky consumption
of alcohol and tobacco. Utilizing BRFSS data and a dierences-in-dierences approach with
entropy balancing, results indicate that individuals in states that introduce legal recreational
marijuana experience a decrease in risky behaviors. Legal states experience a decrease in
the overall use of alcohol, drinking and driving, and smokeless tobacco use. Legalization can
weed out risky behaviors involving alcohol and tobacco, indicating that marijuana represents
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Chapter 1
The Impact of the Olympic Games on
Employment Growth: A Synthetic
Control Approach
1.1 Introduction
Potential hosts ercely compete to host the Olympic Games, the largest sporting event
in the world, in part because of expected economic growth generated by hosting the mega-
event. Hosting the Olympic Games costs billions of dollars, a portion of which taxpayers
subsidize. For example, public funds accounted for $115 million, in 2018 dollars, of the cost
of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, $920 million for the 1996 Summer Olympics in
Atlanta, and nearly $2 billion for the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City (US General
Accounting Oce, 2000). The Games cost $761 million in Los Angeles, $4.3 billion in
Atlanta, and $2.6 billion in Salt Lake City overall (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Host cities
use claimed economic benets resulting from the Olympic Games to justify subsidizing the
cost of hosting the Olympic Games. The exorbitant cost of hosting the Olympic Games,
and taxpayer subsidization of these costs, makes assessing the tangible economic benets
generated by hosting the Games an important topic.
The claimed benets from hosting the Olympic Games includes long-term employment
growth. Employment growth potentially occurs due to construction associated with the
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Olympic Games venues and other Olympic-related construction like new hotels and trans-
portation infrastructure. The International Olympic Committe (IOC) requires host areas to
have more than 40,000 hotel rooms for the Summer Olympics and nearly 24,000 hotel rooms
for the Winter Olympics, an Olympic village capable of housing all participating athletes,
and for sport venues to meet their requirements (Baade and Matheson, 2016). Construction
projects undertaken to meet these requirements potentially generate increases in local em-
ployment. A persistent increase in tourism as a result of hosting the Games represents an
additional mechanism for sustained employment growth. If an inux of tourism occurs after
the Games, the local labor force will expand to accommodate the increase in tourism. This
potential local increase in employment growth serves as the focus of this study.
Previous literature assessed the impact of the Olympic Games on employment growth
in the host area, nding inconclusive results. Hotchkiss et al. (2003) and Hotchkiss et al.
(2015) found a large, persistent increase in employment growth in Atlanta, GA due to hosting
the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. In contrast, Feddersen and Maennig (2013a) revisited
the studies and found no impact on overall employment growth in a reply to Hotchkiss
et al. (2003). Feddersen and Maennig (2013b) found only an increase of 29,000 jobs in July
1996, when the Olympic Games were being held, in only Fulton County (the county in which
Atlanta is located). Games promoters estimated that the 2002Winter Olympic Games in Salt
Lake City would generate 36,000 job-years of employment. However, the Games increased
employment by 4,0007,000, with this increase dissipating quickly (Baumann et al., 2012b).
Prior research on the economic impact of the games primarily uses either an event study
framework comparing outcomes in the host city before and after the Games or a dierence-
in-dierences approach with a relatively small control group. Hotchkiss et al. (2003) use
counties within Georgia that did not hold an Olympic event as their control group, while
Baumann et al. (2012b) use states adjacent to Utah for example. The synthetic control
method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015) represents a reasonable
alternative approach to analyzing the economic impact of the Games.
The methodology utilized in this paper follows the approach used by Islam (2019) to ex-
amine the impact of introducing an National Football League (NFL) team to a metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) on local employment growth. The methodology diers from Islam
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(2019) by analyzing county-level employment growth, a smaller geographic impact area, and
focusing on the Olympic Games. The counties analyzed include Los Angeles County (1984
Summer Games), Fulton County (1996 Summer Games), and Salt Lake County(2002 Winter
Games). Essex County, the host of the 1980 Winter Olympic Games, is excluded due to its
small size and limited data in the pre-treatment period. The xed boundaries of counties
makes county level analysis preferable to MSAs due to changes in the boundaries of MSAs
over time.
Like Feddersen and Maennig (2013b) and Baumann et al. (2012b), the synthetic control
results in this paper show that the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta and the 2002
Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City caused transitory increases in employment growth.
Atlanta experienced the largest impact, experiencing an increase in employment growth in
several years between being selected to host the Games and hosting the Games. Salt Lake
City experienced an increase in only the year following selection to host the Games. The
Summer Olympic Games, a much larger event than the Winter Olympic Games, partially
explains the smaller impact in Salt Lake County relative to Fulton County. The synthetic
control results also show evidence of a negative economic impact from the 1984 Summer
Olympic Games in Los Angeles after being awarded hosting rights but two years prior to
hosting the Games.1
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. The results show that host-
ing the Olympics can either increase or decrease employment growth, but these eects are
transitory. This paper contains the rst evidence of a decrease in employment growth due
to hosting the Olympics. Previous literature nds either positive or no impact. The causal
evidence of a transitory employment impact due to the 1996 Olympics developed here pro-
vides clarity to the debate between Hotchkiss et al. (2003, 2015) and Feddersen and Maennig
(2013a). The synthetic control method represents a casual inference method not previously
used to examine the impact of the Olympic Games. The introduction of this casual inference
method advances the literature.
1Multiple studies utilize the synthetic control method to show transitory impacts (Eren and Ozbeklik,
2016; Kreif et al., 2016; Tirunillai and Tellis, 2017).
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1.2 Hosting the Olympic Games: Process and Impacts
The process of hosting the Olympic Games begins nearly a decade before the Games occur
in a specic area. The host city selection process involves many steps. Consider, for example,
the selection process for the Games of the XXVI Olympiad, informally known as the 1996
Summer Olympic Games, in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta submitted their bid as a potential
US candidate city for the 1996 Games to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in
September 1987. 13 other US cities submitted bids to the USOC. The USOC reduced the
eld from 14 to two, Atlanta and Minneapolis-St.Paul, with Atlanta being selected as the
US candidate city in April 1988.
Atlanta then competed with cities selected by National Olympic Committees (NOCs)
around the world, including Athens, Greece; Toronto, Canada; Melbourne, Australia; Manch-
ester, Great Britain; and Belgrade, SFR Yugoslavia, for the rights to host the 1996 Games.
The following year, IOC members visited each candidate city before holding a vote to select
the host city in 1990. Voting consisted of ve rounds, with the city receiving the lowest num-
ber of votes in each round being eliminated from consideration. Atlanta defeated Athens,
Greece 51-35 in round ve of voting to become the host of the 1996 Olympic Games (Atlanta
Committee for the Olympic Games, 1997). The Winter Olympics follows a similar selection
process.
After the awarding of hosting rights, the NOC forms a local Organizing Committee for
the Olympic Games (OCOG), and dissolves the OCOG after the Games occur. OCOGs
receive local, state, and federal government subsidies in order to put on the Games. The size
of the subsidies depend on the amount of funding the OCOG receives from the IOC and the
availability of private funding. The budget of the OCOG primarily includes operating costs
of the Games, while the host city is largely responsible for infrastructure (Humphreys and
Howard, 2008).
IOC voting on the host city of the Games generally follows the format discussed above,
with one notable exception. Only one city, Los Angeles, placed a bid to host the 1984
Olympic Games. The lack of interest in hosting the 1984 Olympics stemmed from events
surrounding Games prior to 1984, including violence and nancial losses. Mexico City experi-
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enced violence and protests in 1968. Eleven Israeli Olympic athletes were killed by terrorists
in Munich in 1972. The 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal cost nearly 10 times
more that budgeted leading to a debt that took thirty years to eventually pay down. Denver
won the rights to host the 1976 Winter games in 1970 but a 1972 referendum on public
subsidization of the games failed and the games moved to Innsbruck, Austria. Los Angeles
agreed to host following the IOC guaranteeing any losses and conrming the adequacy of
the city's existing sports infrastructure for Olympic events (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.1).
From 1960-2016, sports-related costs averaged $5.213 billion for the Summer Olympics,
and $3.112 billion for the Winter Olympics, in 2015 US dollars (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Non-
sport infrastructure, security, opening ceremonies, and other spending add to the total cost
of hosting the Games. An extravagant opening ceremony alone cost nearly $350 million at
the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, China. Security costs soared following terrorist
attacks throughout the US on September 11, 2001. Athens estimated security costs at $400
million in their initial bid to host the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, submitted before 9/11.
The nal cost ballooned to approximately $1.5 billion (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.4243). Of the
more than $13 billion spent hosting the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro,
non-sport related infrastructure accounted for $8.2 billion (Associated Press, 2017). Total
expenditures to host the Olympics reached as high as $40 billion for 2008 Summer Olympics
in Beijing, and $50 billion for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.2).
The Olympic Games represent a major investment undertaken by host cities. Proponents
of hosting the Games claim that the events will generate an array of positive outcomes, both
socially and economically, in the host area. Opponents claim that there can be negative
outcomes, and the positive impacts that do exist are not large enough to warrant the high
cost of hosting these events.2
Pride and prestige associated with hosting the Olympics potentially generates an uplifted
mood in the host area. Smith (2009) argues for the presence of a connection between hosting
mega sporting events and an increase in mental health in the local community. Hosts often
believe that hosting the Olympics also generates an increase in physical activity, but Bauman
et al. (2013) suggest that physical activity increases much less than projected, or not at all.
2Potential impacts and an assessment of literature are discussed in Scandizzo and Pierleoni (2018).
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Atkinson et al. (2008) conduct a willingness to pay (WTP) study to estimate the value of
intangible benets of hosting the London Olympic Games, nding an aggregate household
WTP of nearly $2 billion. Atkinson et al. (2008) state that, given that economic studies
generally show negligible or negative impacts, this WTP represent a credible approach to
assessing the public choice problem of hosting the Olympics. This WTP pales in comparison
to the actual cost of the London Games to taxpayers. Of the $14.6 billion it cost to host the
2012 Olympic Games in London, $4.4 billion came from taxpayers (Schwarz, 2015).
Prestige associated with hosting the Olympic Games potentially makes the host a more
desirable destination for tourists. Kang and Perdue (1994) found an increase in tourism in
South Korea following the 1988 Olympics. The increase peaked in the year following the
Games and dissipated in the following years. Giesecke and Madden (2011) found no induced
tourism impacts as a result of the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia. Induced
tourism represents a mechanism for a persistent increase in employment.
Negative impacts such as increases in crime in the host area arise as well. Baumann et al.
(2012a) found that the Olympic Games led to a 10% increase in property crime. Hosting the
Olympics or other mega-events, such as the World Cup, can cause political unrest due to
hosting being unpopular among local residents. This occurred in Brazil prior to hosting the
2014 World Cup; widespread political unrest occurred in Brazil during the Confederations
Cup. The Confederations Cup, an international soccer competition held the year prior to
the World Cup (in 2013 in the case of Brazil), drew over a million Brazilian protesters to
the streets. Protesters disproved of the government spending $15-20 billion for hosting the
2014 World Cup. The protests continued as the World Cup approached. Many Brazilian
cities experienced strikes by police and teachers, among other workers, in the run-up to the
World Cup (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.2).
Hosting the Olympic Games requires large infrastructure investments. In addition to the
construction of new sport facilities, the Games also require investment in the surrounding
area on non-sport related infrastructure. The Olympic Games potentially draw substantial
tourism activity, and hosts must be equipped to handle the increased inow of visitors. This
infrastructure requirement could be benecial, potentially boosting employment growth due
to construction. Additionally, the claimed increases in tourist activity could increase in
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employment in tourism related industries.
Employment growth represents the economic outcome of interest in this study for two
primary reasons. First, mixed results on the impact of the Olympic Games on employment
in the literature makes this study necessary to add clarity. Second, the strict infrastructure
requirements for hosting the Olympic Games dictated by of the IOC makes an increase in
local construction activity almost certain to occur. This increase in construction activity
potentially leads to increased employment growth, although it could simply crowd out other
local construction projects.
1.3 Literature Review: Olympic Economic Impact
A substantial literature exists studying the impact of the Olympic Games on employ-
ment, yielding inconsistent results. Studies focusing on the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta
provide an interesting set of conicting results. Hotchkiss et al. (2003) compare counties
near Olympic venues to those not near Olympic venues in Georgia nding a persistent in-
crease in employment due to hosting the 1996 Olympic Games. Feddersen and Maennig
(2013a) questioned this positive impact on multiple grounds, with a focus on accounting for
pre-treatment trends and the treatment period used. Maennig and Fedderson nd no signif-
icant increase in employment associated with hosting the 1996 Games after accounting for
local time trends. They also perform numerous nonparametric tests in lieu of the standard
dierences-in-dierences model tests, again nding no eect.
Hotchkiss et al. (2015) revisited the topic of their initial paper in response to Fedder-
sen and Maennig (2013a). Hotchkiss et al. (2015) again found evidence that employment
growth in Georgia counties near Olympic venues outpaced growth in other Georgia counties.
Hotchkiss et al. (2015) reported positive impacts from hosting the Olympics, but at a lower
magnitude than their original paper. In this study they nd a smaller impact, 11%. Their
comparison of MSAs in Georgia that hosted the Olympics to similar MSAs throughout the
southern United States provides their most convincing evidence. Results indicate that MSAs
hosting the Olympics outpaced employment gain in other southern states by 5%.
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Baade et al. (2002) highlight the importance of the time period studied on results, nding
an employment increase of approximately 3,500 to 43,000 from the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta
depending on the period examined. Baade et al. (2002) found that much of the expenditures
on the Games occurred in 1994 and 1995. Their estimate coincides with the increase of
37,000 jobs projected in Atlanta by Humphreys and Plummer (1995).3
Feddersen and Maennig (2013b) conducted an additional study examining mega-events
and sectoral employment using the 1996 Olympic Games. They analyzed monthly data
for 16 dierent sectors using a nonparametric approach to isolate any employment eects.
Their results show a slight boost in employment, but no evidence of a persistent shift in
employment growth. Fulton County (the county in which Atlanta is located) experienced
an increase of 29,000 jobs in July 1996 when the Games took place. Three sectors of the
economy accounted for the increase retail trade; accommodation and food services; and arts,
entertainment, and recreation.
Baumann et al. (2012b) further studied the impact the Olympics on employment growth
by analyzing the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, UT relative to outcomes in ad-
jacent states. They found an increase in employment substantially lower than estimated
by promoters. Promoters estimated an increase of 35,000 job-years while Baumann et al.
(2012b) nd an increase of 4,000-7,000 jobs using a control group of states adjacent to Utah.
Like Feddersen and Maennig (2013b), the leisure industry accounted for the increase in em-
ployment and the eect dissipated after a year. Considering the mixed results on the impact
of the Games on local employment growth, slight job growth appears associated with host-
ing the Olympic Games, but at a magnitude much less than claimed ex ante and dissipating
quickly.
Research on the economic impacts of hosting the Games extends beyond employment
growth. Rose and Spiegel (2011) nd a robust, permanent and large" increase in exports
as a result of hosting the Olympics. Results indicate that countries placing an unsuccessful
3Humphreys and Plummer (1995) estimated an increase of 77,000 jobs in all of Georgia. With 48% of
Georgia's population residing in Atlanta, Humphreys and Plummer (1995) claims that 48% of the employ-
ment growth would occur in Atlanta. This translates to an increase in approximately 37,000 jobs occurring
in Atlanta. With arguably more than 48% of Olympic spending occurring in Atlanta this forecast is likely
understated.
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 1. The Olympics and Employment Growth 9
bid experienced a similar impact. Maennig and Richter (2012) reexamined this peculiar
result, nding no impact on exports when using an appropriate matching and treatment
methodology, suggesting that results in Rose and Spiegel (2011) may suer from selection
bias.
Baade et al. (2010) assessed the impact of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake
City on local taxable sales. They used quarterly taxable sales data from 1982 through 2006
and estimated an auto-regressive-moving-average (ARMA) model. The overall impact of
hosting Olympics, based on impacts estimated for several dierent local sectors, showed a
net negative eect on taxable sales. While hotels, and eating and drinking establishments
experienced gains, losses elsewhere outweighed these gains leading to a net loss of $167.4
million. Similarly, in a study analyzing the impact of the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in
Sydney Australia, Giesecke and Madden (2011) found that the Olympics generated a loss in
real consumption of $2.1 billion.
The research on the economic impact of another mega-event warrants discussion: the
World Cup, the largest soccer tournament in the world. Baade and Matheson (2004) study
the impact of the 1994 World Cup hosted by the United States using income data from 1970-
2000 to estimate the eect of hosting the Games on income growth. Baade and Matheson
(2004) compared predicted growth to actual growth in each city that hosted a match. Nine
of the thirteen US cities that hosted World Cup matches experienced growth lower than the
predicted value, indicating an economic loss from hosting the event. The combined losses
total up to $9.26 billion compared to the ex ante estimate of $4 billion in benets.
Mega-events such as the Olympic Games and World Cup are high cost/low reward in-
vestments. Positive economic impacts are generally low, if existing at all. Matheson (2012)
discuss that the economic impacts of hosting the mega-events may be even lower for de-
veloping countries. Hosting mega-events can allow politicians to clear political hurdles to
invest in infrastructure, but this comes with paying a large price for unproductive sports
infrastructure. Further reviews of the literature can be found in Scandizzo and Pierleoni
(2018) and Baade and Matheson (2016).
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Data and Methodology
Data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts
CAINC30 dataset. CAINC30 data includes variables reecting annual population, per capita
income, and employment at the county level over the 1969-2016 period. Population estimates
come from the Census Bureau's annual (July 1) midyear population estimates. The BEA
uses this population estimate to calculate per capita income. BEA compiles data on the
county employment level including full-time and part time jobs. Conversion of data from
levels to growth rates, as in Islam (2019), leaves an analysis data set covering 1970-2016.
To examine the impact of the Olympic Games on county employment growth, I use the
synthetic control. The synthetic control method appears throughout the economic literature
analyzing local employment growth (Munasib and Rickman, 2015; Peri and Yasenov, 2015),
as well as in sports economics (Islam, 2019; Pyun, 2018), and in research analyzing overall
economic conditions (Grier and Maynard, 2016). Synthetic control creates a synthetic version
of the treatment area to provide a counterfactual. The control group provides a comparison
to assess the impact of an event or policy. The synthetic version of the treated counties in
this study are constructed using a weighted average of other U.S. counties in a donor pool of
counties with observable characteristics similar to treated counties that hosted the Games.
Donor pools exclude counties contiguous to treated counties and counties that also competed
to host the Olympic Games.
The data contains observations for a total of T years. 1, ..., (T0−1) constitutes the period
before treatment occurs and T0, ..., T the post-treatment period. The treatment occurs in
year T0. The donor pool consists of J + 1 counties, j = 1, 2, 3, ...J + 1 dened so that county
1 is treated. The synthetic control method chooses a vector of optimal weights, W ∗, for each
county in the donor pool that minimizes
k∑
m=1
vm(X1m −X0mW )2 (1.1)
where X1m represents a vector of predictor variables for the treated county (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015; Pyun, 2018). X0m represents a (kxj) vector
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of predictor variables for counties in the donor pool and j indexes the number of counties in
the donor pool. vm reects the weight, showing the relative importance assigned to the mth
variable when measuring the dierence between X1 and X0. Each W ∗ is bounded between
0 and 1, and the total weights must sum to 1.
The synthetic control method selects a weight vm that minimizes the root mean square












where Y represents the outcome variable. RMSPE measures statistical t between outcomes
in the treated and synthetic county, with a lower RMSPE indicating a better t. A high post-
treatment RMSPE indicates a lack of t in the post-treatment period, suggesting important
impacts in treated counties. Comparison of post-treatment and pre-treatment RMSPE shows
the credibility of any impacts found. A large post-treatment RMSPE does not indicate a
large impact of treatment the pre-treatment period also has a large RMSPE, as no discernible
dierence between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods exist. Therefore, a high
post-treatment to pre-treatment ratio indicates a potentially larger impact from treatment
(Abadie et al., 2015).
The synthetic control method requires identifying a donor pool of counties that did not
receive the treatment. The counties included in the donor pool generate the synthetic control
group based on pre-treatment data. Using all US counties as the donor pool poses a problem
as the donor pool will contain many counties with little similarity to the treated county.
To correct for this, the donor pool excludes counties with large dierences in population
compared to the treated county. The donor pool includes counties with populations larger
than 1,000,000 for Los Angeles County, populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 for Fulton
County, and populations between 500,000 and 1,250,000 for Salt Lake County. Robustness
checks show results are not sensitive to using alternative population criterion for identifying
the donor pool.
The construction of a synthetic county follows Islam (2019) who analyzed the impact of
National Football League teams appearing in US cities. Islam (2019) found no evidence of
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positive employment growth eects from new NFL teams. The overall average population
growth and per capita income growth during the pre-treatment period, as well as select
years of the outcome variable employment growth, Y , construct the synthetic control county.
Employment growth every ve years before treatment is used for construction when able to do
so. Kaul et al. (2015) warn against using all past values of the outcome variable to construct
the synthetic control group, as this results in all other predictors having no contributing
weight. Kaul et al. (2015) recommends using one lag for the outcome variable and from the
year prior to treatment. Although three lags of employment growth are used here, results
remain similar when using only one year of employment growth (see Appendix 4.1.1).
I dene the treatment year as the year in which the IOC awards the rights to host
the Olympic Games, not the year when the Games occur. Construction of infrastructure
related to hosting the Olympic Games takes place between the awarding of the games and
the staging of the event and could potentially generate employment impacts. Construction
reasonably begins shortly after the awarding of the rights to host the Games. Feddersen
and Maennig (2013a) consider the second quarter of 1990 as the beginning of the treatment
period when analyzing impact of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. Baade et al. (2002)
found that much of the impact from the 1996 Olympic Games occurred in 1994 and 1995,
with smaller impacts occurring in years prior. This highlights the importance of including
the entire period after gaining the rights to host the Games in the treatment period. Using
this treatment year, the treatment period begins approximately 6-7 years before the Games
occur. The specic treatment years are 1978 for Los Angeles County, 1990 for Fulton County,
and 1995 for Salt Lake County.
Placebo tests act as sensitivity tests to identify signicant impacts on employment growth
due to the Olympic Games. In this approach, every county in the donor pool receives a
placebo treatment" as if the county hosted the Olympic Games. Placebo tests compare
placebo counties to the county that actually hosted the Olympics. When employing placebo
tests, the time path of the outcome variable for the placebo treatments should not signi-
cantly deviate from their synthetic counterpart. A large portion of the donor units exhibiting
similar impacts to the treated unit in the placebo test calls any initial synthetic control results
into question (Abadie et al., 2010).
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 1. The Olympics and Employment Growth 13
Cunningham (2018) discusses constructing p-values based on the placebo tests. After as-
signing placebo treatments to counties that did not host the Olympic Games, post-treatment
to pre-treatment RMSPE ratios are calculated. Where the treated county's post-treatment
to pre-treatment RMSPE ratio ranks among the placebo counties is used to calculate a p-
value. Consider Los Angeles County as an example. The post-treatment to pre-treatment
RMSPE ratios for Los Angeles County and the 19 other counties donor counties are calcu-
lated following the placebo test. Los Angeles County's ratio of 3.4614 ranks third out of 20
counties, yielding a p-value of 0.15 (i.e. 3/20).
1.4.2 Results: The Olympic Games and Employment Growth
Figure 1.1 presents results for the synthetic control method applied to county employment
growth generated by hosting the three Olympic Games. The upper panel shows results for the
1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles County, the middle panel the 1996 Summer Olympics
in Fulton County, and the bottom panel the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake County. In
each panel a dashed vertical line identies the treatment year, the year in which the IOC
awarded the host the Olympic Games, and a solid vertical line identies the year in which
the Olympic Games occurred. The solid vertical line highlights any impacts experienced
around the year the Games occurred, either through construction taking place close to the
Games, or job creation due to increases in tourism.
Table 1.1 shows the counties that contribute to the synthetic Los Angeles County. Mid-
dlesex County, MA, a county in Boston containing Cambridge, MA, represents the largest
contributor at 0.266. Bronx County, NY follows at 0.239, and Santa Clara County, CA at
0.212. Table 1.2 shows predictor balance and root mean square prediction error for this case.
Average population growth, average income growth, and three select years of employment
growth select the synthetic Los Angeles County.4 Treatment occurred in 1978, so the three
years of employment growth rates used include 1970, 1974, and 1977. From Table 1.2, Los
Angeles County and Synthetic Los Angeles County exhibit good predictor balance. Each
predictor variable utilized shows little or no dierence between real and synthetic Los Ange-
4While Islam (2019) selects the three years in ve year increments. Here a shorter time span between
years is used due to data beginning in 1970.
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les County. While a ratio of post-treatment to pre-treatment RMSPE well above 1 suggests
a potentially signicant impact from hosting the Olympics, a p-value of 0.15 suggests no
persistent shift in the post-treatment time path of employment growth.
Results in Figure 1.1 indicate a potential negative impact on employment growth rate
in Los Angeles County after being awarded the Olympic Games. The gap between actual
and synthetic Los Angeles appears negative from 1979-1985 with the largest gap occurring
in 1982. In 1982 employment in synthetic Los Angeles County grew at a rate of 0.7% while
Los Angeles County experienced a decline in employment growth of -2%. A p-value of 0.15
indicates no persistent impact on employment growth. However, a high post-treatment to
pre-treatment RMSPE ratio, in addition to results shown in Figure 1.1 suggest a negative
transitory eect on employment growth in Los Angeles County.
Reduced employment growth is a potentially surprising result given the legacy of the
1984 Summer Olympic Games, which were generally regarded as a success. Prior to Los
Angeles being awarded the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, no city wanted to be the host,
following a series of tumultuous Olympic Games. With the IOC oering a guarantee to
cover any losses, and Los Angeles having some appropriate infrastructure in place to host
the Games, the city agreed to host. The 1984 Games proved to be one of the most nancially
successful Games in history, turning a modest prot of $215 million (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.1).
The nancial success of the 1984 Games spurred renewed competition to host the Olympics
in the following years.
The synthetic control results indicate that this nancial success came with high costs
economically, in terms of a loss in employment growth. An excess demand for building
materials and construction labor induced from hosting the Olympic Games can explain
lower output in a tight labor market. In a tight labor market, induced labor demand will
not lead to additional output, but instead cause reallocation of scarce resources towards the
Olympic Games-related economic activity.
Next, consider the results from the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta (Fulton
County). Table 1.3 shows the synthetic control weights following the methods described
in Section 4.1. Essex County, MA, which lies adjacent to Boston, represents the largest
contributor at 0.42. Montgomery County, MD, a county adjacent to Washington D.C. and
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the most populous county in Maryland, follows at 0.355.
Predictor balance and RMSPE are presented in Table 1.4. Predictor balance indicates
a good t with nearly identical population growth, per capita income growth, and employ-
ment growth in treated and synthetic Fulton County. A high p-value of 0.5384 indicates no
persistent shift in employment growth, but a post-treatment to pre-treatment RMSPE ratio
greater than one suggests the potential for transitory impacts.
The middle panel of Figure 1.1 shows the time path of actual employment growth in
Fulton County and synthetic Fulton County. Overall actual employment growth lies above
synthetic employment growth following treatment through 1997, with the exception of 1991
and 1992. The largest gaps between the actual and synthetic employment growth occur
between 1993 and 1997. This increase coincides with the construction of Centennial Olympic
Stadium. Construction of Centennial Olympic Stadium started in 1993, on July 10th, with
completion and opening of the stadium occurring on May 18th, 1996 (Atlanta Committee
for the Olympic Games, 1997). Hosting the Olympics seems to have had a temporary
positive impact on employment growth in Fulton County, particularly in the lead up to,
and hosting of, the 1996 Summer Games. The largest gap occurs the year Fulton County
hosted the Games, when Fulton County outpaced synthetic Fulton County by 3.2 percentage
points. Synthetic Fulton grew at a rate of 2% and Fulton County grew at 5.2%. Fulton
County experienced large impacts in 1993, and 1994 as well, with employment growth more
than doubling in comparison to synthetic Fulton County. While Fulton County experiences
signicant short-term employment growth, the impact appears to dissipate by 1998.
The 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City serves as the nal US Olympics
analyzed studied. Like Atlanta, Salt Lake City faced competition to become the host of the
Olympic games, prevailing over bids from Quebec City, Quebec, Canada; Sion, Switzerland;
and Östersund, Sweden (Baade et al., 2010). Table 1.5 shows the synthetic control weights.
Pima County, AZ, which contains Tuscon, represents the largest contributor at 0.485. Du-
Page County, IL, a county adjacent to Chicago, follows at 0.364. Oklahoma County, OK,
location of the state capital Oklahoma City, contributes 0.146.
Table 1.6 reports predictor balance and RMSPE. The closeness of predictor variables
between Salt Lake County and synthetic Salt Lake County indicates a good t. As in Fulton
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County, a high p-value of 0.4737 indicates no persistent shift in employment growth, but
a post-treatment to pre-treatment RMSPE ratio greater than one suggest the potential for
transitory impacts.
The the bottom panel on Figure 1.1 shows the time path of actual employment growth
in Salt Lake County and synthetic Salt Lake County. Employment growth rates in Salt Lake
County and synthetic Salt Lake County lie close to one another following treatment, with
the exception of 1996 and 1997. In 1996 and 1997 Salt Lake County grew at a rate of 5.4%
and 3.7% while synthetic Salt Lake County grew at 2.4% and 2.2%, respectively. This spike
correlates with hotel expansion in Salt Lake City that occurred from 1994 to 2002. In that
span of time, the number of hotel rooms in Salt Lake County increased by 63%, an increase
that led the director of sales and marketing for the rst ve-star hotel in Salt Lake City to
state: There's no doubt we're overbuilt, a 63 percent growth is tough to support no matter
where you are. Las Vegas, whatever"(Isidore, 2002). Hosting the Olympics appeared to
generate a positive shock on Salt Lake County in the two years following treatment. Similar
to Fulton County, the positive employment growth dissipates quickly.
To assess the ability of synthetic control to capture economic impacts, placebo tests act as
signicance tests. Placebo tests apply the synthetic control method to every unit in the donor
pool. This approach indicates whether treatment or randomness drives the results. When
employing placebo tests, the time path of the outcome variable for the placebo treatments"
should not signicantly deviate from their synthetic counterpart. Figure 1.2 reports placebo
tests for each of the three Olympic Games with the gap in employment growth between
the county tested and the county's synthetic counterpart graphed on the Y axis in each
year. The bold black line represents the county that hosted the Olympic Games, while the
light gray lines each represent a county in the donor pool. Impacts experienced by the host
county compared to placebo counties determines the signicance of the impacts, based on
the percentage of donor units that deviate from the treated county. A large percentage
of placebo counties experiencing larger changes in employment growth than the treatment
county calls into question the validity of the synthetic control results.
The top panel of Figure 1.2 shows placebo test results for the 1984 Los Angeles Games.
A large portion of the post-treatment period appears to no have a signicant impact on Los
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Angeles County with the exception of 1982. In 1982 only one placebo county experienced
an eect larger than Los Angeles. This placebo county is dropped in Appendix 4.1.2 when
placebo counties with high mean squared prediction errors (MSPE) are removed from the
donor pool (Abadie et al., 2010).5
Placebo test results for the 1996 Atlanta Games appear in the middle panel of Figure 1.2.
Fulton county experienced signicant increases on employment growth in 1993, 1994, and
1996, in line with the years containing signicant employment increases reported in previous
studies (Feddersen and Maennig, 2013b; Baade et al., 2002). The bottom panel of Figure 1.2
shows placebo test results for the 2002 Salt Lake Games. Placebo test results indicate that
Salt Lake experienced increased employment growth in only one year, 1996. An increase in
employment appears in 2007 as well, however the amount of time passing between treatment,
hosting, and this increase coupled with the lack of impact prior to 2007 calls into question
attributing this increase to the Olympic Games.
Results in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate that each county experienced some transitory
impacts to employment growth after acquiring the rights to host the Games. Los Angeles
County saw a decrease in employment growth two years prior to the Games being held.
Fulton County and Salt Lake County each experienced transitory increases in employment
growth. Salt Lake County's growth coincides with a documented increase in hotel construc-
tion, while Fulton County's growth matches the time period of construction of the Centennial
Olympic Stadium. The lack of a persistent increase in employment growth calls into question
the claimed benet of persistent increases in tourism caused by hosting the Games.6
5Abadie et al. (2010) present placebo tests dropping donor states that have MSPE two times, ve times,
and twenty times higher than the treated state.
6The counties studied represent the focal point of each Olympic Games, but few events were held in
other counties throughout the hosting state. Considering the size of the event that the Olympics represents
and events being held throughout Olympic hosting states, analyzing spillover eects becomes important.
Appendix 4.1.3 presents results analyzing state-level impacts.
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1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Alternate Donor Pools
Due to the subjective nature of selecting counties to include in the donor pool, using
alternative population limits to identify donor counties checks the robustness of results.
Alternative selection criterion use both a wider and narrower range of county populations
to identify donor counties. Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 present results using alternative donor
pool criteria.
For the 1984 Games, donor pools using counties with populations greater than 750,000
and 1,250,000 test for sensitivity, compared to the 1,000,000 population threshold utilized
for results above. Figure 1.3 indicates that results are not sensitive to the donor pool
composition, nding a decrease in employment growth in each alternative donor pool. The
alternative population criterion for the 1996 Games includes counties with population of
250,000 to 1,250,000, and 500,000 to 850,000 instead of 500,000 to 1,000,000 used above.
Figure 1.4 indicates that Fulton County experienced employment growth in 1993 through
1997 for each alternative donor pool.
Figure 1.5 presents results for the 2002 Games. While the original donor pool in-
cludes counties with populations from 500,000 to 1,000,000, alternative ranges of 250,000
to 1,500,000 and 650,000 to 1,000,000 constitute the alternative donor pools. As with Los
Angeles County and Fulton County, initial results for Salt Lake County persist when using
these alternative donor pools.
Failed Olympic Bids
The three Olympics Games analyzed above generated transitory impacts on employment
growth. As a robustness check, I consider unsuccessful bids to host the Games by Minneapo-
lis, MN (Hennepin County) and Chicago, IL (Cook County). Minneapolis unsuccessfully bid
against Atlanta to represent the USOC in the competition for the 1996 Olympics. Chicago
advanced further into the bidding process, being selected by the USOC to compete with Rio
De Janeiro, Brazil; Madrid, Spain; and Tokyo, Japan to host the 2016 Summer Olympic
Games (Baade and Sanderson, 2012). Chicago spent more than $100 million on the failed
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 1. The Olympics and Employment Growth 19
bid attempt (Zimbalist, 2016, pp.42).
Counties may select into bidding to host the Olympic Games based on a belief that the
county will experience substantial economic growth in the future. Analyzing counties with
unsuccessful bids to host the Olympic Games mitigates concerns of selection bias by counties
that bid to host the Olympics. Issues with selection bias appears throughout the literature
on the economic impact of the Olympics; for example Maennig and Richter (2012) refute
results in Rose and Spiegel (2011) on these grounds.
The analysis of outcomes Cook County, IL and Hennepin County, MN follows the same
approach as Los Angeles County, Fulton County, and Salt Lake County, using population
growth, income growth, and three select years of employment growth. Cook County, the
second largest county in the US, uses a donor pool consisting of counties with populations
larger than 1 million. Hennepin County's donor pool includes counties with a population
between 500,000 and 1,250,000, the same range used for Salt Lake County. 1988 represents
the treatment year for Hennepin County, the year in which the USOC selected Atlanta over
Minneapolis, MN.
Table 1.7 shows synthetic control weights and reports RMSPE for Hennepin County.
The largest contributor to synthetic Hennepin County is Hartford County, CT at 0.365,
followed by Prince George's County, MD (0.263) and Oakland County, MI (0.203). Table 1.8
presents predictor balance and pre-treatment model t. A high p-value and post-treatment
to pre-treatment ratio less than one suggest no post-treatment change in Hennepin County.
Synthetic control results are presented in Figure 1.6. Since the USOC did not select Hennepin
County's bid to host the Olympic Games, there should be no discernible eects seen after
the bid failed. From Figure 1.6, decreases in employment growth can be seen between actual
and synthetic Hennepin County. However, Figure 1.7 presents placebo tests, highlighting
the absence of any signicant gap.
Synthetic Cook County provides an arguably more telling examination of the role played
by selection bias in this setting. Chicago made it to the nal phase of IOC voting to
determine the host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, costing Chicago $100 million in bid
preparation costs in the process. Allegheny County, PA (0.566) and Cuyahoga County, OH
(0.223) constitute most of synthetic Cook County, as shown in Table 1.9. Allegheny County,
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PA includes the city of Pitsburgh, and Cuyahoga County, OH includes Cleveland.
As with Hennepin County, results on Table 1.10 show a high p-value of 0.6 and a post-
treatment to pre-treatment ratio less than one, indicating no signicant impact on employ-
ment growth. There are no discernible dierences between actual and synthetic Cook County
found in either the synthetic control results nor placebo tests shown in Figures 1.8 and 1.9.
Overall, synthetic control results from these two counties that made unsuccessful bids show
no evidence of an economic impact, mitigating concerns that selection bias drives the re-
sults in actual host counties. This further validates the robustness of results for Los Angeles
County, Fulton County, and Salt Lake County.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of three separate Olympic Games held in the United
States between 1984 and 2002 on the employment growth rates in the counties that hosted
the Games. The synthetic control method assesses this impact by constructing synthetic
Fulton, Salt Lake, and Los Angeles counties to provide valid comparison groups for each
Games. The Games examined include one Winter and two Summer Games. The results
show transitory changes in employment growth following the awarding of the rights to host
Olympic Games; positive transitory eects on two counties and a negative transatory impact
in one.
A decrease in employment growth occurred in Los Angeles County in 1982, caused by
hosting the Games. In contrast, Fulton County and Salt Lake County each experienced tran-
sitory increases in employment growth. Fulton County experienced increased employment
growth in 1993, 1994, and 1996. Salt Lake County experienced a smaller increase in em-
ployment growth in a single year, 1996. The smaller size of the Winter Olympics compared
to the Summer Olympics partially explains why Fulton County experienced a larger impact
than Salt Lake County.
Back of the envelope calculations reveal the magnitude of the impact of hosting the
Olympic Games by calculating the dierence between Olympic host counties and their syn-
thetic counterparts in signicantly dierent years. For Los Angeles County in 1982, the
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only year of signicant impact, the Olympic Games resulted in a decrease about 118,000
jobs relative to synthetic Los Angeles. In 1982 Los Angeles County actually lost over 86,000
jobs, experiencing an employment growth rate of nearly -2%. While Los Angeles County
lost employment, synthetic Los Angeles County grew at a rate of 0.7%, accounting for an
increase of nearly 32,000 jobs. The increase in jobs in synthetic Los Angeles County, coupled
with Los Angeles County experiencing a decrease in over 86,000, leads to a net dierence of
about 118,000 jobs.
The same approach applies to increase employment growth experienced in Fulton and Salt
Lake County. Signicant dierences between Fulton County and synthetic Fulton County in
1993, 1994, and 1996 led to an increase of about 63,000 jobs. The 63,000 increase resembles
the forecasts in Humphreys and Plummer (1995). Job creation of over 24,000 in 1996 due
to the Olympic Games resembles results in Feddersen and Maennig (2013b). Feddersen and
Maennig (2013b) estimated an increase of around 29,000 jobs in 1996, the year the Games
took place. Salt Lake County experienced signicant positive employment growth in 1996.
Based on the dierence between outcomes in Salt Lake County and synthetic Salt Lake
County, the Olympic Games accounted for an increase of about 17,000 jobs.
Results show that Olympic-generated increases in employment growth dissipated quickly
in Fulton and Salt Lake County, consistent with results in previous research Baumann et al.
(2012b) and Feddersen and Maennig (2013b). The transitory increase in Fulton and Salt
Lake County can be attributed to increased construction activity following selection as the
host city, as well as anticipation of increased future tourism as a result of hosting the Games.
The absence of sustained increases in employment growth suggests that anticipated persistent
increases in tourism do not occur. While Fulton County and Salt Lake County experienced
transitory increases in employment growth, Los Angeles County experienced a decrease.
Overall, results presented in this paper call into question the use of the Olympic Games
as a tool for local economic development. While hosting the Games may generate transitory
increases in employment growth, the decreases in employment growth in Los Angeles provides
evidence that potential hosts should proceed with caution when considering a bid to host
the Olympic Games.
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Figure 1.1: Impact of the Olympic Games on Employment Growth: Actual vs Synthetic
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Table 1.1: Synthetic Control Weights: Los Angeles County
County Weights
Middlesex County, MA 0.266
Bronx County, NY 0.239
Santa Clara County, CA 0.212
King County, WA 0.163
San Diego County, CA 0.121
Table 1.2: Predictor Balance and RMSPE: Los Angeles County
Predictor Variables Actual Synthetic
Population Growth 0.0046 0.0046
Income Growth 0.0757 0.0765
Employment Growth(1970) -0.0117 -0.0116
Employment Growth(1974) 0.0202 0.0203





RMSPE=Root Mean Squared Prediction Error
Table 1.3: Synthetic Control Weights: Fulton County
County Weights
Essex County, MA 0.42
Montgomery County, MD 0.355
Faireld County, CT 0.169
Duval County, FL 0.038
DuPage County, IL 0.017
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Table 1.4: Predictor Balance and RMSPE: Fulton County
Predictor Variables Actual Synthetic
Population Growth 0.0120 0.0118
Income Growth 0.0883 0.0882
Employment Growth (1979) 0.0354 0.0353
Employment Growth (1984) 0.0596 0.0595





RMSPE=Root Mean Square Prediction Error
Table 1.5: Synthetic Control Weights: Salt Lake County
County Weights
Pima County, AZ 0.485
DuPage County, IL 0.364
Oklahoma County, OK 0.146
Macomb County, MI 0.004
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Table 1.6: Predictor Balance and RMSPE: Salt Lake County
Predictor Variables Actual Synthetic
Population Growth 0.0181 0.0181
Income Growth 0.0521 0.0524
Employment Growth (1984) 0.0596 0.0727
Employment Growth (1989) 0.0307 0.0305





RMSPE=Root Mean Square Prediction Error
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Figure 1.2: Employment Growth Rate Gaps in Host Counties and Placebo Gaps
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Figure 1.3: Synthetic Control Results with Alternative Donor Pools: Los Angeles County
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Figure 1.5: Synthetic Control Results with Alternative Donor Pools: Salt Lake County
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Table 1.7: Synthetic Control Weights: Hennepin County
County Weights
Hartford County, CT 0.365
Prince George's County, MD 0.263
Oakland County, MI 0.203
Contra Costa County, CA 0.133
Fairfax County, VA 0.036
Table 1.8: Predictor Balance and RMSPE: Hennepin County
Predictor Variables Actual Synthetic
Population Growth 0.0071 0.0071
Income Growth 0.0880 0.0880
Employment Growth (1977) 0.0441 0.0441
Employment Growth (1982) -0.0177 -0.0097





RMSPE=Root Mean Square Prediction Error
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Figure 1.7: Placebo Tests: Hennepin County
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Table 1.9: Synthetic Control Weights: Cook County
County Weights
Allegheny County, PA 0.566
Cuyahoga County, OH 0.223
Palm Beach County, FL 0.085
Orange County, CA 0.077
Santa Clara County, CA 0.05
Table 1.10: Predictor Balance and RMSPE: Cook County
Predictor Variables Actual Synthetic
Population Growth .042808 .0416506
Income Growth -.0027651 -.0027719
Employment Growth (1998) .0200487 .0200708
Employment Growth (2003) -.0071709 -.0071971





RMSPE=Root Mean Square Prediction Error
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Chapter 2
Wage Discrimination in the NBA:
Evidence using Free Agent Signings
2.1 Introduction
The racial structure of host standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA) inuences the
racial structure of National Basketball Association (NBA) teams due to consumer preference
to see players of their own race, potentially leading to a large racial wage gap (Burdekin
and Idson, 1991). Racial wage gaps, their size, and their existence are essential topics of
study in labor economics. Professional sports provides an appropriate setting to examine the
potential impact of race on salary. Economists have studied racial wage discrimination in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, specically
the discrimination against black athletes. Some studies report that black athletes were not
paid as highly as their white counterparts; however, the results found across the literature are
largely inconsistent. Moreover, this literature has not been examined in recent NBA history.
Thus, inconsistent and outdated results motivated this study. We utilize an improved data
set and empirical approaches not previously used in the NBA labor market literature to
examine the presence and size of the racial wage gap in this labor market.
A portion of our empirical approach most resembles that of Holmes (2011). First, we use
the same sample selection process, restricting the sample to include only free agent contract
signings. Moreover, we use weighted least squares and quantile regressions to further explore
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our ndings of discrimination in the NBA, the main approaches used by Holmes (2011) to
nd discrimination within the MLB. Additionally, we use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
an approach previously seen in the general labor market and sports literature, but not
previously used to analyze the NBA labor market.
Our analysis goes beyond investigating an average racial wage gap. This research, in
addition, further investigates discrimination in the NBA by considering three sources of racial
discrimination: consumer, employer, and employee discrimination (Becker, 1971). Consumer
discrimination is explored using the weighted quantile regressions with an interaction term
between black players and the share of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population
that is white. Employer and employee discrimination are examined by interactions between
the race of players with the race of coaches and general managers, which is an approach
previously explored by Hamilton (1997).
Our results show that black athletes are paid in the league on average 20.5% less than their
counterparts, ceteris paribus. More importantly, 63.9% of this wage gap cannot be explained
by observable characteristics and, therefore, is attributed to racial discrimination. Thus, our
results indicate the presence of a racial wage gap of 13.1% in the NBA. The wage gap is
shown to be robust through various econometric approaches using dierent specications
including or excluding population characteristics and using alternative statistics for player
performance.
We nd that consumer discrimination is the primary source for this racial wage gap. This
result is derived from our weighted quantile regressions which include an interaction term
between the percentage of white population in the employing team's MSA and an indicator
variable for whether a player is black. The results indicate that the gap between black
and non-black players increases as local share of white population increases. The quantile
regressions also show the racial wage gap to only be signicant for the upper portions of the
salary distribution, which includes role and star players.1 Role and star players are dened
in this research as players with high court visibility relative to bench players, with bench
players being located in the lower portion of the salary distribution.
1The characterization of players is given based on the distribution of salaries as done by Hamilton (1997).
The specic criteria for characterization of players will be further dened in Section 4.
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This type of discrimination manifests itself through consumers due to their preference for
watching those of the same race on the court (Burdekin and Idson, 1991). The experience
of watching a game is the product consumed by customers in this market; hence, the most
visible players should be the only ones signicantly aected by consumer discrimination if
it exists in this market. The conclusions drawn by this paper arise and dier from previous
literature due to an important empirical contribution this papers brings to the NBA labor
market literature, the use of a data sample which considers only free agents.
The data set we use includes NBA free agency signings from 2011-2017. Data has been
a limitation in this literature, as previous papers do not use free agents or usually includes
short sample periods. Using free agent signings, previous season performance, and the cor-
rect use of other control variables provide an appropriate framework to explore a player's
compensation for his expected current level of output.2 In other words, we are able to more
accurately capture his marginal revenue product. Holmes (2011) recognizes this shortcom-
ing of the sports literature regarding the racial wage gap, but investigates the MLB labor
market. We are the rst to apply this to the NBA setting to examine the racial wage gap.3
The length of the data set used in this paper must also be highlighted since most NBA labor
market papers, with the exception of Hill (2004), Groothuis and Hill (2013), and Hill and
Groothuis (2017), investigated wage discrimination against black athletes in the NBA using
two or fewer years of data. The data set used here covers free agents from six NBA seasons,
which gives us a sample of nearly 800 free agents.
2.2 Literature Review
The amount of papers that study the wage gap between black and non-black men is
extensive. Lang and Lehmann (2012) provide a theoretical and empirical review on wage
discrimination in the U.S. labor market. The divergence of results in this literature are
generally explained by the dierent control variables and data range used by dierent authors
2For instance, an analysis of a player's pay compared to his current performance that, for example, is in
his second year of a three year contract does not yield accurate results.
3Johnson and Hall (2018) utilizes free agent signings to examine the impact of variation in state income
tax rates on NBA player salaries.
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due to theoretical considerations and/or data limitations. After reviewing the literature,
Lang and Lehmann conclude that a wage gap of approximately 10% exists between white
and black male workers, which is similar to our results for the NBA labor market. Moreover,
the authors point out an important result of Lang and Manove (2011), who state that the
wages converge for workers with very high and very low levels of education, or human capital,
which highlights the importance of analyzing dierent quantiles of the wage distribution.
A vital dierence to be pointed out between typical goods and services market and the
NBA is their nal goods. Goods and services which can be consumed by individuals generally
represent the U.S. labor market's nal goods. On the other hand, the NBA labor market
oers a nal good which sells the experience of watching a basketball game. This is important
because the NBA nal goods are dependent on the exposure of its workers (players), which
is not necessarily true for the U.S. labor market, since buyers frequently do not know which
worker specically produced their good or service they are consuming.
In regards to research on discrimination more specic to sports, the topics covered is
broad. For instance, it covers the impact that race has on playing time and salaries in the
NFL (Burnett and Van Scyoc (2015); Keefer (2013); and Keefer (2016)4), on the probabil-
ity of an umpire calling a strike in the MLB (Parsons et al., 2011), and on the wages of
English soccer players (Szymanski, 2000). Other studies, Hoang and Rascher (1999) and
Groothuis and Hill (2004), have focused on exit discrimination nding contrasting results.
The literature has also explored the connection between productivity and wage inequality
(Berri and Jewell, 2004) and population racial structure and capital investments (stadium
reforms) (Bodvarsson and Humphreys, 2013). Results put forward by Price and Wolfers
(2010) suggest discrimination among NBA referees. Kahn (1991) provides a review of early
studies on this topic related to all sports. Even though discrimination can be studied through
several channels, the focus on this paper is to dig deeper on the empirical ndings of wage
discrimination against black players in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
There exists a substantial literature regarding NBA wage discrimination; however, the
inconsistency of their results piqued our interest in this topic. Kahn and Sherer (1988)
examine salaries in the 1985-1986 season to nd that black players are underpaid by 20%.
4Keefer (2016) nds black players start and play more.
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Moreover, they also nds that replacing a black player with a white player increases atten-
dance, which indicates the presence of consumer discrimination. Burdekin and Idson (1991)
studies consumer based discrimination testing the hypothesis that whites prefer to see white
players." Interestingly, they nd that the percentage of white population in the host SMSA
is strongly correlated with the percentage of white athletes on the respective NBA team.5
Gius and Johnson (1998) claim that the racial wage gap was gone by 1996-1997. Hamilton
(1997) shows no premium on average received by whites; however, using a quantile regression
he highlights a preference from the audience for white players. Groothuis and Hill (2013)
study exit discrimination, pay discrimination, and career earnings of NBA athletes using data
from 1990-2008, nding conicting results. Both reverse discrimination and discrimination
are found to be potentially present, however the results found are not robust.
Hill (2004) nds that black players are underpaid by 14% to 20% after analyzing a
period from 1990 to 2000, but that such wage gap drops out when controlling for height.
Hill points out that not controlling for height caused the white indicator variable coecient
to capture the premium that taller players received, due to the fact that white players are
on average taller than black players in the NBA. In addition, Kahn and Shah (2005) shows,
with a monopsony model, that nonwhite players that were not free agents nor on rookie
contracts were underpaid, but the dierence was small under rookie contracts and small and
insignicant for free agents in the 2001-2002 NBA season. Lastly, Ajilore (2014) focuses
on whether white players suer statistical discrimination nding no statistical dierences
between black and white.
Recent literature has focused more on the inux of foreign players. Eschker et al. (2004)
shows a wage premium for foreign players for the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 season, and
Hoer and Freidel (2014) nds that foreign players receive an average wage premium of
approximately $900,000. Moreover, Hill and Groothuis (2017) nd that foreign born who
did not attend to college in the U.S. earn a premium in the 1990s, but that such premia
disappears in earlier years. Foreign athletes changed how NBA teams scouted, drafted, and
5The hypothesis posited in Burdekin and Idson (1991) implies that blacks prefer to see black players".
Murray (2015) replicates the results found in Burdekin and Idson (1991) using data from the NBA for the
2009-10 through 2013-14 seasons nding a similar result.
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acquired talent. Our paper addresses this concern by including indicators for both foreign-
born players who played US college basketball and for those who developed their talents
abroad.
The NBA discrimination literature experiences shortcomings. Most papers focus only
one or two seasons6 and do not use free agents data to determine wage discrimination. Using
players that are in the middle of their contract to test for discrimination by using their past
season or current season performance as control variables will not accurately estimate the
determinants of a player's contract. Player performance in the prior season should not have
any power in determining the player's contract value if it is not a newly signed deal during
free agency.
A player can regress or improve drastically throughout the duration of his contract making
him far outperform or underperform the expectations of his predetermined salary. Player
injury is also a concern when considering players in the midst of a current contract.7 The
same intuition is valid for other control variables such as coach's and GM's race, signing team
and original team win percentages, age, etc. For instance, this gives a possible explanation
for the inconsistency of the presence and size of a racial wage gap presented by the NBA labor
market literature. These inconsistencies in data sets that do not capture wage determinants
provide us with an opportunity to add to this strand of literature.
2.3 NBA Labor Market
The data utilized in this paper contains free agency signings over a period of 2011 to
2017. The NBA labor market contains many intricacies. New incoming players generally
enter the NBA through an entry draft. The structure of a player's contract is determined by
his draft position, or a player can be undrafted in which he becomes a free agent. Salaries
for rst round draft picks follow a rookie salary scale. The value of the contract of a rst
round pick decreases as the number of the slot they are selected later in the draft, and can be
negotiated between 80-120% of the scale value. Contracts for rst round selections contain
6With the exception of Hill (2004), Groothuis and Hill (2013), and Hill and Groothuis (2017)
7For example, Derrick Rose played only 10 games in the 2013-2014 NBA season, while being paid over
$17 million as part of a contract extension he and the Chicago Bulls agreed to in 2011.
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 2. Wage Discrimination in the NBA 39
two guaranteed years followed by team options for each the third and fourth season. Going
into the fth season of the contract a player can sign an extension, sign a qualifying oer,
or become a restricted free agent. Second round picks and undrafted players do not receive
guaranteed contracts and are able to negotiate their contracts. Rookie contracts are not
considered in this paper as they are largely xed and negotiated without regarding prior
NBA performance.
Restricted free agency diers from unrestricted free agency in that players are not able
to sign and play for any team. Unrestricted free agents are free to sign with any team
they choose, conditional on that team desiring their services. In contrast, a restricted free
agent is subject to his team's right of rst refusal. Restricted free agents can sign an oer
sheet from another team, of which his current team has the ability to match the oer and
retain the rights to the player. Restricted free agents are generally paid a higher salary than
unrestricted free agents, which is highlighted in our results.
Restricted free agency can impact the free agency period of the player, as well as teams
that are interested in pursuing their services. Free agency during our sample period begins
on July 1st followed by a short moratorium period. After the moratorium period, players
can sign a contract or an oer sheet. For restricted free agents, after signing an oer sheet
their current team has a three day period to match the oer. This three day period can
aect a teams pursuit of other free agents and potential trade oers.
During free agency periods, teams are constrained by the amount they compensate play-
ers. Contracts have a minimum and maximum value that vary based on a player's accolades,
NBA experience, whether or not a player is re-signing with their current team, among other
characteristics. A maximum contract can be generally 20-35% of the total salary cap space
of the team. A player can be incentivized to re-sign with their current team when he is a
player that can draw a max contract. For instance, during the 2018 NBA free agency period
LeBron James was eligible for a 5 year $205 million contract if he had chosen to re-sign with
the Cleveland Cavaliers. He ultimately chose to receive only" a maximum contract of 4
years for $152 million when he decided to sign with the Los Angeles Lakers.
Players can also receive performance bonuses written into their contracts such as playing
a certain amount of games, and keeping a certain level of performance, which is evaluated
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through their statistics. Ideally, the minimum and maximum values should be censored for in
the empirical analysis used in this paper. This required us to individually investigate which
player received a max contract every time they appear in our sample. This investigation was
done by reading news articles about new contracts signed. Unfortunately, we cannot say with
certainty that the media indeed reported all players which received a max contract; hence,
this variable may be misrepresenting the sample of players which signed a max contract.
Due to this data limitation, our baseline results including an indicator for max contracts are
presented in the appendix. The results with the inclusion of max contracts are similar in
signicance and magnitude.
2.4 Materials and Methods
2.4.1 Data Description
The data on NBA player race was retrieved similarly to Price and Wolfers (2010) and
Van Scyoc and Burnett (2013). At least three dierent observers analyzed the pictures from
NBA player bios on the NBA's ocial website and basketball-reference.com to determine
whether a player appears to be black or non-black. This approach is appropriate as players
will be discriminated against based on their appearance, and not their genetic race or ethnic
background. An indicator is used to identify black players that takes a value of 1 or 0. The
same approach is used to determine the race of coaches and general managers. Coaches'
and GMs' information were gathered from a combination of basketball-reference.com, bas-
ketball.realgm.com, and news articles.
Information on NBA free agency signings from 2011-2017 will be used to nd if discrim-
ination exists in the NBA currently. Data on 797 NBA free agent signings was taken from
spotrac.com, a website that aggregates data from various reliable sources of NBA informa-
tion including transactions, signings, and contracts. Player salaries are taken as an average
salary value by dividing the total value of their contract by the length of the contract in
years. The natural log of a player's annual salary is the dependent variable of all the empiri-
cal specications explored in this paper. The empirical specications used in this paper also
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include proper control variables to allow us to better identify the impact of race on player's
annual salary. Various statistics and characteristics are used for both team and player.
These include: team winning percentage, player characteristics, performance statistics, and
information on the MSA that contains the team.
Player characteristics include age, height, race, foreign-born indicators, draft position,
and position played. Performance statistics used will be points, rebounds, assists, blocks,
steals per game, and eld goal percentage. Also included is the amount of games played by
the player, their minutes played per game, and in what percentage of games played did the
player start. The percentage of games started is used to help control for a starter versus
a bench player. Games played is included to help control for players that are signed but
do not play whether for skill deciency or injury. All of the performance and games played
statistics are from the season before the players signed their new contracts as their output
in the previous season is assumed to be the main driver in their salary following their free
agency. Most player statistics, player characteristics, and team winning percentage were
all obtained from basketball-reference.com. Height and draft position were obtained from
basketball.realgm.com.
An additional statistic is used in various specications throughout this paper referred to
as Value Over Replacement Player (VORP). VORP gives an aggregate measure of a players
on court performance and their overall value to their team. This measurement comes from
basketball-reference.com and was constructed by Daniel Myers. VORP compares the impact
of players to a theoretical replacement player based on their Box Score Plus/Minus (BPM)
and the actual percentage of their team's minutes played. Box Score Plus/Minus estimates
how well a player performs compared to an average player per 100 possessions, which is
dened as 0.0. For example, the highest BPM in the sample is LeBron James in 2015-2016
when he posted a 9.1 BPM, which means James was 9.1 points better per 100 possessions
than the average player in the league. For the purposes of VORP, -2 is considered the value of
a replacement player. The formula for VORP is [BPM −˘(−2.0)]∗ (percentage of minutes
played)*(team games/82).
While any box score based metric is not perfect as they can not account for the importance
of basketball IQ, fundamental skills, or how eective of a team defender a player may be,
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VORP is an appropriate measure to be used. In the specications using VORP, the number
of minutes, points, rebounds, assists, steals, and blocks per game and the number of games
played in the previous season are all dropped. This is because VORP includes proxies for
these performance measures among others in its calculations.
We also ran the regressions using Win Shares (WS), Player Eciency Ratings (PER), and
Wins Produced (WP) as alternative advancement measurements for performance.8 These
advanced performance statistics are able to capture the eciency and productivity of a
player better than the alternative specications using per game statistics. Nonetheless,
our results are robust across the use of any of these performance variables. The results
are nearly identical in size and signicance when using either VORP or WP. PER and
WS yield similar signicance, but slightly lower coecients compared to VORP and WP.
VORP, WS, and PER are each retrieved from basketball-reference.com, while WP comes
from boxscoregeeks.com.9
To investigate the eect of coach and general manager characteristics in the contracting
process, this study considers the coach and general manager race as well. Race informa-
tion for coaches and general managers were retrieved from a combination of basketball-
reference.com, basketball.realgm.com, and news articles.
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data to control for demographic characteristics of
the city hosting the team includes total population and percentage of the total population
that is white. This approach to control for population characteristics is motivated by Bod-
varsson and Humphreys (2013). The population data came from the American Community
Survey website. Statistics Canada from the government of Canada was used to gather pop-
ulation characteristics for the Toronto Raptors.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the entire sample of free agents, black players,
and non-black players. The average annual salary received by NBA free agents was over $5
million for each sample, with non-black players having a higher average salary than black
players. This initial comparison served as a motivation to further investigate this nding.
8The results including these alternatives can be provided upon request.
9https://www.basketball-reference.com/about/glossary.html provides more information on the calcula-
tion of these VORP, WS, and PER. Wins Produced is discussed in Berri (2010).
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Figure 2.1 shows the kernel density of black and non-black athletes. Overall, the dierences
in density across the salary distribution of non-black players appear to lie slightly above
black players in the both the middle and upper sections of the salary distribution.
To produce meaningful results, we must rst deter whether our data consists of repre-
sentative sample of the NBA athletes. To do so we compare the distribution of black players
in our sample, 78%, to the distribution of black players in the NBA as a whole, around
75-80%, which is fairly representative (Spears, 2016). As highlighted in the literature, the
role of foreign players is important in the NBA. In our sample, almost half of non-black
players, 46%, are foreign. Nonetheless, foreigners only constitute 16% of all the players in
our sample. Overall, information on 797 free agent signings was obtained. Other noticeable
dierences between black and non-black players are the frequency which players re-signed,
average draft position, and average performance (according to VORP). In general, non-black
players perform better, re-sign more, and are drafted later in the draft.
2.4.2 Methodology
Three main econometric specications are explored to investigate whether a racial wage
gap is present in the NBA: a weighted Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, a weighted least
squares (WLS) wage model, and weighted quantile regressions. The weighted twofold Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition follows an approach previously used in the general labor market (e.g.:
Neal and Johnson (1996), Neumark (1988), and Boudarbat and Connolly (2013)) and sports
literature (e.g.: Van Scyoc and Burnett (2013), Keefer (2013), Burnett and Van Scyoc (2015),
and Leeds and Leeds (2017)), but that from the best of our knowledge is for the rst time
being explored to analyze the NBA labor market. This decomposition was rst introduced
by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). This approach explores how much of the gap between
the regressions results of two dierent samples is explained by observable characteristics (El-
der et al., 2010). It allows us to evaluate how much of the wage gap between two groups is
not explained by the vector of predictors; in other words, we are able to determine how much
of the wage gap is due to discrimination given that we have an appropriate set of control
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variables. In this section, we will present the standard twofold specication.10
First, consider two groups: non-black (1) vs. black (2) players. Let g be an indicator
variable for 1 or 2. Let Yg be the log of the average salary for a member of group g and for
it to be dened by Yg = X ′gδg + εg. We take the log of the average salary to transform the
data to handle skewness. Xg represents a vector with predictors for group g. δg is the vector
of coecients for each predictor and the intercept and εg the residual for group g. Assuming
that E(δg) = δg and E(εg) = 0, after estimating the regression coecients for both groups,
it is straightforward to dene the racial wage gap as
G = Y 1 − Y 2 = (X1 −X2)δ1 +X2(δ1 − δ2), (2.1)
Redening the two terms on the right-hand side of the equation above as E and U ,
respectively, allows us to rewrite the equation as
G = E + U. (2.2)
E represents the racial wage gap that is explained" by systematic dierences in the
predictors of both groups. In other words, the endowment eect" (Jann, 2008). U , on the
other hand, indicates the log salary dierential that is unexplained" by our predictors, which
is dened in the literature which used this decomposition as the discrimination eect".
In our model, we control for population, team, coach, general manager and player char-
acteristics; race; performance; and season, team, and position xed eects. Moreover, the
model is weighted by the inverse of the amount of contracts signed by a player. It is weighted
in this manner to control for players that sign multiple contracts throughout the period so
the results are not driven by few players signing multiple short contracts. In the sample 250
players signed one contract, 143 signed two, and one player (Ronnie Price) signed six. The
rest of the sample signed between three and ve contracts. In the regressions, a player that
signs one contract will have a weight of 1, a player signing two contracts will have a weight
of 0.5, and so on.
The standard twofold decomposition creates a counterfactual base concern as noted by
10For a more detailed explanation of the model please refer to Jann (2008).
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Boudarbat and Connolly (2013). Since the result generated from the model specied above
is based on the perspective of group 2 (black players), altering the denition of group 1 and
2 can theoretically generate dierent results to some extent. As an answer to this concern,
we instead run a pooled twofold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as suggested by Neumark
(1988). This specication uses coecients from a pooled regression (black and non-black
together), where an indicator variable for whether a player is black is included (Jann, 2008).
In addition, robust standard errors are also applied in the derivation of our results.
Another potential concern is the pooled twofold Oaxaca-Blinder decompositon may po-
tentially understate the discrimination eect compared to OLS. To answer this concern, we
use another approach to validate our racial wage gap empirical results, a weighted least
squares (WLS) wage model. This empirical framework is very comparible with previously
used econometric models seen in the NBA racial discrimination literature. The closest spec-
ication to ours, however, was used in the analysis of the MLB labor market by Holmes
(2011). To determine the NBA racial wage gap, once again we take the log of the average
salary. The log-linear model to test for discrimination based on race is then dened by
ln(Salaryijps) = γj + αi + τs + β1Performanceij(s−1) + β2Populationj + β3Racei
+β4WinningPctj(s−1) + β5His + β6Coach/GMRacejs + eijs.
(2.3)
The model includes all the predictors used in the Oaxaca-Blinder model. More speci-
cally, Performanceij(s−1) contains a vector of performance measures for player i and team
j in season s− 1. Populationj controls for the population level and proportion of the popu-
lation that is white in the area surrounding team j. Racei is an indicator variable for player
i taking a value of 1 if a player is identied as black. WinningPctj(s−1) controls for the per-
formance of the team a player was under contract with in the previous year, and the team
they signs with during free agency. The vector His contains player characteristics variables.
Coach/GMRacejs controls for race of coach and general manager in charge of team j at the
beginning of season s. γj represents a xed eect for the team a free agent signs with, αi is
a xed eect for the position player i plays, and season xed eects is dened by τs. This
model is weighted by the same approach described in the weighted Oaxaca-Blinder model.
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 2. Wage Discrimination in the NBA 46
Running an unweighted ordinary least squares regression yields similar results, which can be
provided upon request.
To explore whether the discrimination is concentrated in certain types of players, we also
run weighted quantile regressions. These regressions are extremely useful in this scenario
since their results are not based on the sample mean as the WLS regression; rather, they
estimate the function for the natural log of salary quantiles conditional on the control vari-
ables specied by the model. According to Holmes (2011), such model diminishes the eect
of outliers since they are based on the median of determined quantiles of the distribution
of the dependent variable, which in this case is the log of a player's salary. The quantile




ρθ(ln(Salaryijps) − Aijpsβ) (2.4)
where using an indicator function, I(.), allows us to dene ρθ as:
ρθ(A) = (θ − I(A ≤ 0))A (2.5)
For Equation (2.4) and Equation (2.5), A represents a vector including all the control
variables specied on the right-hand side of Equation (2.3), and β represents the vector of
coecients of Aijps. Moreover, changing θ denes which quantile we are getting our results
based upon. Players once again are weighted by the inverse of the number of contracts
which they signed during the sample period we analyze. The following section will analyze
empirically such models and further investigate the results they generate.
2.5 Results
To examine the size of the racial wage gap we begin our discussion by interpreting the
results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. We then re-evaluate our results using a
weighted least squares (WLS) model. We follow the examination of the size of the racial
wage gap by testing for the three dierent sources of discrimination previously highlighted
by Becker (1971): employer, employee, and consumer.
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Employer discrimination refers to an employer paying his/her employee less due to racial
characteristics. In the NBA, we can think of this channel being translated to the relationship
between players and general managers (GM) as well as their coaches, since a GM generally
has control of the team, but with input from coaches. This relationship can also serve as the
channel for employee discrimination. Consumer discrimination, on the other hand, refers to
a decrease in salary explained by consumer preferences. In this league, since around 75-80%
of players are black, a premium for non-black players could be seen as a preference of the
audience for watching non-black players on the court. This paper follows Becker (1971), in
which each of the channels of discrimination denes discrimination as being correlated to
individuals' tastes for characteristics similar to theirs.
To investigate the relationship between the race of players with the races of coaches and
GMs to test for employer and employee based discrimination, the WLS specication is used.
In addition, we use quantile regressions to test for consumer discrimination.
2.5.1 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Model
The results of our pooled twofold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are reported in Table 2.2.
Columns 1-4 show dierent specications, adjusting for alternative performance measures
and adding population controls. Each specication includes player, team, GM, and coach
characteristics. Control variables for columns (1) and (3) for performance include points,
assists, rebounds, blocks, and steals per game as well as eld goal percentage. Columns (2)
and (4) use VORP instead of per game statistics to control for performance. In specications
using VORP, games played and eld goal percentage are also dropped, as they are included
in VORP. We also run regressions with dierent specications using alternative advanced
metrics such as WP, WS, and PER, which yield similar results and can be provided upon
request. In columns (3) and (4), population controls are added, including population size
and the percentage of the population that is white from the MSA hosting the player's signing
team.
We select Column 4 as our preferred specication, proposing that it includes the most
appropriate control variables based on the current data availability. In this paper, we select
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VORP as our preferred performance measurement for two reasons: (1) its ability to be
interpreted as a measure of a player's value and (2) its aggregation characteristic, which
allows us to have a more concise measure of performance of a player.
Table 2.2 indicates the existence of a 20.5% gap in the mean average salary between
black and non-black players, with the latter receiving this premium. 36.2% of this gap
is attributed to systematic dierences in characteristics of black and non-black athletes;
however, this is not signicant. The remaining portion of this gap is unexplained by the
predictors used in our decomposition model. Following the papers in the literature which
explore the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we interpret this unexplained portion of the
wage gap as the discrimination that black players suer in the NBA labor market. Thus,
this model indicates that black NBA players on average receive 13.1% less than non-black
NBA players, all else equal.
2.5.2 Weighted Least Squares Regression
We estimate a weighted least squares model to further explore the existence of the racial
wage gap in the NBA using Equation (2.3). This allows us to compare our results with the
previous literature, which used similar econometric specications, but data sets containing
certain limitations as discussed. Moreover, Elder et al. (2010) shows that the twofold Oaxaca-
Blinder may overstate the contribution of observed characteristics, thus understating the
discrimination eect; hence, this specication also function as a robustness check for the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results. The results are shown in Table 2.3.
The results for player and team characteristics are as expected. Age is found to have a
quadratic relationship with salary, also seen in Johnson and Hall (2018). A player is compen-
sated more when re-signing with their current team, when they are restricted free agents, or
when signing multi-year contracts. An explanation for players that re-sign receiving a higher
salary comes from these players being eligible for a higher maximum salary from their re-
spective team. Also, if a team values a player they can pay more to retain his services. This
result shows that players do not on average give teams a hometown discount". Restricted
free agents are generally young players completing their rookie contracts that have higher
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potential than other free agents. Their current team has the ability to match an oer sheet
and the player will be forced to stay with this team. This, as well as the NBA salary cap
structure, leads to these players receiving large contract oers from other teams to make it
more dicult for their current team to match.
We posit that multi-year contracts have a positive eect on wages because a player
on a one year contract may be signed roster ller or otherwise not included in the long
term plan for his team, while players with multi-year contracts will be on the team long-
term. Contract length and salary are shown to be positively related as in Krautmann and
Oppenheimer (2002). Points, rebounds, assists, and minutes per game are found to be
positive as expected. Due to the amount of variables, per game statistics are not reported.
In specications using VORP, a higher VORP increases salaries. We also nd that players
signing after playing for a team with a high winning percentage receives a higher salary, and
players that sign with a team that has a high winning percentage will receive a lesser salary.
The lesser salary from signing with a better team could be a partial result of ring chasing"
behavior in the NBA. 11
In each specication, discrimination is shown to be present in the NBA, ranging from
black players being underpaid between 11.6 - 13.1% with our preferred specication being
column 4. Column 4 shows a wage gap of 13.1%. The wage gap is identical when using
both the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and WLS regression. Our general ndings of wage
discrimination goes against the qualitative results found by Ajilore (2014) and Hill and
Groothuis (2017), but it agrees qualitatively with Kahn and Sherer (1988). Groothuis and
Hill (2013) nds similar quantitative results, but their results are not robust. We believe
our results diverge from previous literature due to the use of a data set including free agents
only, which is something not explored by previous authors. As previously highlighted, our
sample of free agents can more properly control for the marginal revenue productivity of each
player when determining wages. Moreover, interestingly our results are comparable with the
average wage gap found in the U.S. labor market (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). We however
do not nd any signicant results on the eect of GM and coach race on player salary.
11For instance, veteran player David West opted out of a $12.6 million dollar contract, then signed with
a San Antonio Spurs for the veterans minimum of approximately $1.5 million.
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 2. Wage Discrimination in the NBA 50
2.5.3 Employer and Employee Discrimination
We further explore the impact of coach's and GM's race to examine dierent sources
of discrimination, such as through employer and employee preferences for working with an
individual of the same race. In the WLS results shown in Table 2.3, there are no results
found to show a signicant eect of coach's or GM's race on player salaries. However, we are
motivated to explore this relationship by Hamilton (1997). Hamilton nds no evidence of
these variables being signicant in determining a player's wage. We explore this relationship
further because using data with free agents only could yield dierent results. Thus, we run
WLS regression models as specied in column (4) of Table 2.3, but including an interaction
term between player's and GM's race or between player's and coach's race. These results are
shown Table 2.4 columns (1) and (3). Additionally, we use a logit regression to determine
if black players are more likely to re-sign with a black coach or GM relative to a white
coach or GM. As in the WLS regressions, players here are weighted based on the inverse of
the number of contracts each player signed during the sample period which the data was
collected. These results are shown Table 2.4 columns (2) and (4). The interaction terms
between player with coach's and GM's race yields no signicant results on player salaries or
their likelihood to re-sign. When adding an interaction term between player and coach the
wage gap is found to increase, but it lowers when interacting player's and GM's race.
2.5.4 Consumer Discrimination
In this subsection we investigate whether the results found above are due to consumer
discrimination. Since around 75% of players in the NBA are black, we hypothesize that the
discrimination results from a preference of the audience to observe a group of players on
the court similar to themselves, as in Burdekin and Idson (1991). We do not assume that
audiences have disdain for the opposite race (Becker, 1971). We posit the idea that consumer
discrimination connects with players' visibility, in other words, it connects with the amount
of time a player is on the court. Hence, we run quantile regressions, an approach previously
used in the sports wage discrimination literature, as specied by Equation (2.4) and (2.5) to
investigate if the discrimination result is concentrated on more visible players, players who
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spend more time on the court.
We assume here that the lower quantiles (10th and 25th) capture bench players, players
who do not consistently play a large amount of minutes, as previously assumed by Hamilton
(1997). We allow the 90th quantile to capture star players. This label is due to results
from Humphreys and Johnson (2020) and Hausman and Leonard (1997), who show that star
players are drivers of attendance in the NBA. Star players are the most visible players on
the team, thus we can expect them to be subject to the highest amount of discrimination.
Figure 2.2 plots minutes per game and salary, showing that players who receive a higher
salary generally play more minutes per game. Additionally, the correlation between minutes
per game and salary is 0.6268. Initially, utilizing quantiles to capture star players raises
concern regarding the proportional of players that are black and non-black across the salary
distribution, particularly star players. The racial breakdown in the top 10% of salaries and
the entire sample are 77% and 78%, respectively. We refer to the 50th and 75th quantiles as
role players, who can be seen as players who stay on the court the longest after the teams'
star players (90th quantile). If consumer discrimination is present, we expect such result to
be found on the 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles due to the higher visibility of those players.
Our quantile regressions results can be seen in Table 2.5.
Given our classication of dierent players based on distribution of salaries this table
provides support for our hypothesis of presence of consumer discrimination in the NBA.
This result can be observed in columns 3 through 5, which reports that black players who
are role or star players (50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles, respectively) receive a signicantly
lower pay due to their race relative to their counterparts, all else equal. More importantly,
the empirical results show that as a black player becomes more visible to the audience, higher
is the racial wage gap he faces. In addition, the result of no discrimination found for bench
players seems plausible due to their low average of minutes played per game.
To state with condence that the NBA faces consumer discrimination warrants further
analysis. In response, we ran additional quantile regressions including an interaction term
between black players and the share of white population in the MSA which the player's team
is located. The result of a negative and signicant coecient for the interaction term would
indicate that the gap between black and non-black athletes' salaries increases in MSAs with
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a higher share of white population. The results of the quantile regressions including this
interaction term are reported in Table 2.6.
In general, a higher share of white population in the MSA where the team is located is
associated with higher salaries for both black and non-black players; nonetheless, this eect
is not symmetric. Salaries for black athletes increase at a slower rate than non-black athletes
as white population increases when interacting the two variables, increasing the racial wage
gap. While the discrimination on the 50th percentile from Table 2.5 loses signicance, the
interaction term is found to be negative and signicant for both the 75th and 90th quantiles,
with the 90th percentile experiencing a larger eect. Burdekin and Idson (1991) supports
this result as the authors nd consumer preferences to watch their own race play shapes NBA
team structure. This consumer preference leads to a higher value placed on non-black athletes
as white population increases, due to the NBA being approximately 75% black. Since the
nal good consumed during an NBA basketball game is watching players play in the game,
consumers are concerned with the race of players who are on the court. The preference of
consumers to interact with those of their own race is apparent in the results shown in Table
2.6 and provides empirical evidence of the existence of consumer discrimination in the NBA.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 indicate a possible premium being given to foreign-born players. At
the bottom of the salary distribution foreign-born players with no U.S. college experience
receive a premium, while foreign-born players with U.S. college experience who we label
as role players receive a premium. A premium for foreign players is not found in other
specications. We do not make any claims to a foreign premium existing, as the results are
not robust.
2.6 Conclusion
This study investigates empirically wage discrimination against black players in the NBA
using an empirical method not previously used to study the NBA, as well as methods com-
monly used to strengthen the results found. We also use a more suitable data set considering
only free agency signings. This allows us to more properly capture how a player is compen-
sated for his marginal revenue product. Using both the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and
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a weighted linear wage model controlling for player performance, player, team, and employer
characteristics, it is found that black NBA athletes are on average underpaid by 13.1%
compared to their non-black counterparts. Moreover, our results suggest the presence of
consumer discrimination in the NBA, nding an increase in the racial wage gap as the share
of white population in the player's team MSA increases.
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Table 2.1: Mean of variables used in the regressions, by race
Non-black Black Total
Avg Salary (in 000s) 5590 5144 5242
Player is Black 0.000 1.000 0.780
Foreign-Born  No College 0.38 0.04 0.11
Foreign-Born  College 0.08 0.05 0.05
Age 28.66 27.69 27.90
Games Played 58.25 56.64 57.00
% of Games Started 0.377 0.374 0.375
Minutes Played Per Game 19.96 20.75 20.58
Points Per Game 7.741 8.244 8.134
Rebounds Per Game 3.842 3.437 3.526
Assists Per Game 1.766 1.826 1.813
Blocks Per Game 0.421 0.387 0.394
Steals Per Game 0.547 0.671 0.644
VORP 0.605 0.571 0.579
Previous Team Win % 0.518 0.508 0.511
Signing Team Win % 0.529 0.517 0.520
Re-sign 0.469 0.350 0.376
Height in Inches 80.62 78.45 78.93
Draft Position 33.69 28.59 29.71
Head Coach is Black 0.251 0.278 0.272
GM is Black 0.143 0.204 0.191
Population (in 000s) 6414 6157 6213
White Population 66.66 65.86 66.04
Restricted Free Agent 0.194 0.130 0.144
Multi-year Contract 0.606 0.592 0.595
Observations 175 622 797
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 2. Wage Discrimination in the NBA 56
Table 2.2: Pooled Twofold Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-black 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗
(205.34) (202.87) (205.45) (203.44)
Black 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗
(361.58) (359.25) (361.49) (359.23)
Dierence 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(2.44) (2.41) (2.44) (2.42)
Explained 0.0889 0.0780 0.0878 0.0743
(1.12) (1.02) (1.11) (0.97)
Unexplained 0.116∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(2.39) (2.08) (2.41) (2.14)
Observations 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
Position, team, and year xed eects included
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Weighted Least Squares Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salary Salary Salary Salary
Age 1.573∗∗ 3.210∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗ 3.208∗∗∗
(2.23) (4.13) (2.24) (4.15)
Age2 -0.261∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
(-2.16) (-4.05) (-2.18) (-4.09)
Multi-year Contract 0.397∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(7.93) (9.97) (7.92) (10.05)
Foreign-Born  No College -0.00949 0.0468 -0.00386 0.0560
(-0.14) (0.59) (-0.06) (0.70)
Foreign-Born  College 0.123 0.0380 0.121 0.0305
(1.50) (0.35) (1.49) (0.28)
Restricted Free Agent 0.296∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(4.97) (5.75) (4.99) (5.77)
Games Played 0.00128 0.00125
(0.94) (0.92)
% of Games Started -0.0252 0.594∗∗∗ -0.0194 0.598∗∗∗
(-0.28) (7.75) (-0.22) (7.80)
Field Goal Percentage 0.103 0.0968
(0.34) (0.32)
Previous Team Win % 0.846∗∗∗ 0.319∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗
(5.67) (1.93) (5.74) (2.09)
Signing Team Win % -0.773∗∗∗ -0.720∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗
(-4.40) (-3.64) (-4.39) (-3.55)
Re-sign 0.156∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(3.35) (2.79) (3.34) (2.76)
Draft Position -0.000579 -0.00690∗∗∗ -0.000593 -0.00689∗∗∗
(-0.54) (-6.22) (-0.55) (-6.23)
Height in Inches 0.0198 0.00182 0.0191 -0.000596
(1.49) (0.13) (1.44) (-0.04)
Head Coach is Black -0.0413 -0.0233 -0.0527 -0.0549
(-0.65) (-0.32) (-0.78) (-0.72)
GM is Black -0.0690 -0.109 -0.0555 -0.0903
(-0.87) (-1.15) (-0.67) (-0.91)
Black -0.116∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(-2.29) (-2.00) (-2.31) (-2.05)
VORP 0.287∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(11.19) (11.13)
Population (000,000s) -0.134 -0.0463
(-0.56) (-0.15)
White Population 0.0231 0.0539
(0.82) (1.57)
Per Game Performance Y N Y N
Position, Team, & Year Fixed eects Y Y Y Y
Observations 797 797 797 797
R2 0.769 0.699 0.769 0.701
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: General Manager and Coach Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salary Re-sign Salary Re-sign
Player is Black -0.138∗∗ -0.336 -0.124∗ -0.301
(-2.01) (-1.16) (-1.92) (-1.08)
Head Coach is Black -0.0600 -0.318 -0.0535 0.107
(-0.48) (-0.59) (-0.70) (0.32)
GM is Black -0.0791 0.463 -0.0152 0.0822
(-0.80) (0.93) (-0.09) (0.12)
Black Player and Coach Interaction 0.00866 0.509
(0.07) (0.98)
Black Player and GM Interaction -0.0737 0.461
(-0.47) (0.76)
Player & Team Characteristics Y Y Y Y
Position, Team, & Year Fixed eects Y Y Y Y
Observations 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Quantile Regression Results
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary
Age 3.667∗∗∗ 2.926∗∗∗ 4.288∗∗∗ 2.811∗∗∗ 1.916∗
(4.69) (4.53) (9.12) (3.41) (1.77)
Age2 -0.601∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.727∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗ -0.322∗
(-4.62) (-4.32) (-9.31) (-3.25) (-1.75)
Population (000,000s) -0.162 -0.180 0.0922 -0.00956 0.219
(-0.42) (-0.55) (0.34) (-0.03) (0.55)
White Population 0.0188 0.0561∗∗ 0.0468 0.0478∗∗ 0.0623
(0.40) (2.16) (1.24) (2.01) (1.40)
Multi-year Contract 0.374∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(6.05) (11.15) (13.94) (14.43) (7.97)
Foreign-Born  No College 0.188∗ 0.0967 0.0590 0.0497 -0.00705
(1.65) (1.45) (0.65) (0.68) (-0.08)
Foreign-Born  College -0.0193 -0.0584 0.0458 0.191∗∗ -0.0679
(-0.15) (-0.45) (0.54) (2.48) (-0.51)
Restricted Free Agent 0.465∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(4.46) (7.99) (6.64) (5.28) (2.76)
% of Games Started 0.510∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
(3.88) (9.26) (9.97) (8.13) (6.71)
VORP 0.273∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(7.23) (11.31) (9.59) (8.79) (7.19)
Previous Team Win % 0.296 0.114 0.242 0.474∗∗ 0.404∗
(1.22) (0.64) (1.50) (2.52) (1.83)
Signing Team Win % -0.623∗∗ -0.645∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗ -0.760∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗
(-2.13) (-3.30) (-2.48) (-3.62) (-2.01)
Re-sign 0.146∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.133∗
(2.29) (3.13) (2.85) (3.00) (1.89)
Draft Position -0.00372∗∗ -0.00454∗∗∗ -0.00694∗∗∗ -0.00732∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗
(-2.30) (-4.53) (-6.88) (-6.17) (-7.53)
Height in Inches -0.0231 -0.0259∗ -0.0141 0.0182 0.0247
(-1.23) (-1.93) (-1.05) (1.32) (1.20)
Head Coach is Black -0.0911 -0.0421 -0.0570 0.0148 0.0511
(-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.82) (0.18) (0.51)
GM is Black 0.0765 -0.0434 -0.141 -0.126 -0.202
(0.55) (-0.42) (-1.38) (-1.46) (-1.52)
Black 0.0416 -0.0136 -0.105∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.49) (-0.20) (-1.76) (-2.31) (-2.63)
Position, Team, & Year Fixed eects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 797 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Quantile Regression Results: Black Player and White Population Interaction
(10%) (25%) (50%) (75%) (90%)
Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary
Age 3.673∗∗∗ 3.084∗∗∗ 4.313∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗
(3.24) (6.28) (7.65) (2.70) (2.45)
Age2 -0.601∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗
(-3.16) (-6.09) (-7.71) (-2.64) (-2.24)
Population (000,000s) -0.149 -0.171 0.0969 0.0893 0.0784
(-0.39) (-0.59) (0.31) (0.26) (0.25)
White Population 0.0230 0.0519∗∗ 0.0500 0.0604∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.66) (2.27) (1.29) (1.99) (3.00)
Multi-year Contract 0.373∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(5.97) (11.92) (13.73) (12.47) (10.78)
Foreign-Born  No College 0.188 0.114∗ 0.0552 0.0321 0.0374
(1.36) (1.78) (0.56) (0.38) (0.41)
Foreign-Born  College -0.0266 -0.0803 0.0454 0.161∗ -0.0259
(-0.27) (-0.62) (0.47) (1.72) (-0.22)
Restricted Free Agent 0.445∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(3.71) (9.01) (6.25) (3.30) (3.48)
% of Games Started 0.510∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(4.67) (11.20) (8.34) (9.21) (7.43)
VORP 0.270∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(6.91) (16.17) (8.98) (8.72) (8.87)
Previous Team Win % 0.298 0.0824 0.249 0.493∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(1.20) (0.51) (1.49) (2.98) (2.62)
Signing Team Win % -0.614 -0.627∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.755∗∗
(-1.63) (-3.86) (-2.38) (-3.22) (-2.53)
Re-sign 0.148∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(2.55) (3.64) (2.57) (3.26) (2.19)
Draft Position -0.00357∗∗ -0.00464∗∗∗ -0.00703∗∗∗ -0.00803∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
(-2.13) (-4.82) (-6.16) (-6.56) (-8.16)
Height in Inches -0.0213 -0.0265∗∗ -0.0148 0.0162 0.0132
(-0.96) (-2.07) (-1.10) (1.10) (0.72)
Head Coach is Black -0.0891 -0.0413 -0.0531 -0.00397 0.0647
(-0.85) (-0.93) (-0.71) (-0.04) (0.74)
GM is Black 0.109 -0.0587 -0.145 -0.156 -0.232∗∗
(0.70) (-0.86) (-1.41) (-1.57) (-1.98)
Black -0.00562 0.109 -0.0161 0.484 0.546
(-0.01) (0.36) (-0.04) (1.53) (1.48)
Black Player and White Pop Int 0.000724 -0.00176 -0.00152 -0.00965∗∗ -0.0114∗∗
(0.10) (-0.42) (-0.28) (-2.05) (-2.18)
Position, Team, & Year Fixed eects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 797 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Can Legalization Weed" Out Risky
Behaviors? Determining Whether
Marijuana Acts as a Substitute or
Complement
3.1 Introduction
Potential economic, political, and social outcomes associated with legalization of recre-
ational marijuana appears frequently in debates. Support for marijuana stems from multiple
sources including medicinal properties, allowing law enforcement to focus on more serious
crimes, advancing freedom of choice, and generating large tax revenues. Opponents to mar-
ijuana legalization claim that marijuana would increase trac accidents, harms users, and
acts as a complement to other drugs and risky behavior. The introduction of legal recre-
ational marijuana potentially impacts the consumption of alcohol and tobacco for individuals.
Thus, legalization provides an important topic since tobacco and alcohol represent the rst
and third most common causes of preventable deaths in the U.S.1
Legalization began in November 2012 during the Presidential election. Colorado and
Washington (state) each held votes that successfully legalized recreational marijuana. Le-
1https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/brochures-and-fact-sheets/alcohol-facts-and-statistics
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gal sales of marijuana eventually became implemented in January 2014 in Colorado, and
July 2014 in Washington. Following the legalization of Washington and Colorado, Oregon,
Washington D.C., and Nevada followed among others. These states are the subject of this
study as they represent the only states that have both legalized and implemented marijuana
into the legal market. These states will be included in the treatment group in this paper,
with the control group consisting of states that have liberalized marijuana through legalizing
medical marijuana or decriminalizing marijuana. This control group provides a sample of
states that are more comparable to states that legalize marijuana than states that have made
no progress toward legalization.
The behaviors examined include moderate and risky consuming alcohol and tobacco.
Examining these behaviors determines whether marijuana can act as a substitute or com-
plement for these other legal goods. Previous literature found that marijuana can be a
complement or a substitute to various risky behaviors (Anderson et al., 2013; Chu, 2015;
Chan et al., 2020). This paper uses a dierences-in-dierences approach to examine whether
marijuana acts as a substitute or complement. In order to achieve covariate balance between
the treated and control samples, entropy balancing is used (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy
balancing creates a better matched sample to satisfy selection on observables.
This paper contributes to the literature by exploring a wide array of risky behaviors across
multiple legal goods following legalization of recreational marijuana. Previous literature
largely focuses on medical marijuana laws and generally studies the impact of marijuana on
one particular good. In addition, di-in-di with entropy balancing determines the impact of
legalization of marijuana on residents of legal states compared to liberalized states, allowing
for well dened treated and control groups. This allows to test for possible casual evidence
of the impact of legalization on risky behaviors. Results show a decrease in overall alcohol
consumption, the use of smokeless tobacco, and less drunk driving indicating that marijuana
acts as a substitute.
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3.2 Literature Review
Extensive research exists on the relationship between marijuana and other good, yielding
mixed results. Subbaraman (2016) provides an interdisciplinary review of literature studying
substitution and complementarity of alcohol and cannabis. Of the 39 papers reviewed,
substitution is supported by 16 while 10 support complementarity.2
Early studies show a complementary relationship between marijuana and other sub-
stances. Pacula (1998) and Williams et al. (2004) nd that the demand for both alcohol and
marijuana decrease as price of alcohol increases indicating the two substances act as com-
plements. Saer and Chaloupka (1999) look at the cross price eect of marijuana, alcohol,
cocaine, and heroin generally nding a complementary relationship with marijuana and the
other substances.
Results put forth by more recent literature contradicts previous studies. Anderson et al.
(2013) nd that following the introduction of marijuana laws, trac fatalities decrease,
with this eect being larger for alcohol related fatalities. This result suggests that alcohol
and marijuana are substitutes. Using a regression discontinuity, Crost and Guerrero (2012)
nd marijuana consumption drops after the age of 21 while alcohol consumption increases,
indicating alcohol substituting for marijuana. Choi et al. (2019) examines the substitution of
marijuana and cigarette by studying medical marijuana laws. Medical marijuana laws cause
a decrease in adult cigarette consumption by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. The reductions
leads to substantial cost savings of $4.6-6.9 billion.
Dragone et al. (2019) examines the impacts of recreational marijuana in counties of
states that legalize. Dragone et al. (2019) focuses their study on crime, nding a decrease
in rape, property crime, and thefts.3 To explore the mechanisms, they consider marijuana
a substitute for alcohol and other drugs.4 While marijuana is associated with relaxation,
alcohol is associated with aggression. Dragone et al. (2019) potentially understates due to
interstate tracking of recreational marijuana, particularly in a study using border counties.
212 papers support neither and one paper supports both.
3Further studies nd the marijuana legalzation is not associated with an increase in crime (Morris et al.,
2014; Kepple and Freisthler, 2012; Freisthler et al., 2013).
4Dragone et al. (2019) does not specify what drugs are included when discussing other drugs"
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The intensity of interstate tracking appears in Hansen et al. (2017), nding that follow-
ing legalization in Oregon, marijuana retailers along the border of Washington and Oregon
experienced an immediate decrease in sales by 41%. Hansen et al. (2020) continues research
on recreational marijuana looking at recreational marijuana legalization and trac fatal-
ities using the synthetic control method. Constructing both a synthetic Washington and
Colorado, no dierence in trac fatalities involving alcohol or marijuana appear.
Chu (2015) examines the relationship between the passing of medical marijuana laws and
usage of marijuana and hard drugs. Results show a decrease in arrests for possessing heroin
or cocaine. The decrease in arrests for heroin and cocaine, and the increase in marijuana
usage suggest that marijuana is a substitute for these hard drugs. Further evidence for
marijuana being a substitute is drawn from a decrease in treatment for heroin. Chu (2015)
also nds that marijuana usage increases following the passage of medical marijuana laws.
Chu (2014) results show an increase in marijuana use as well.
Results presented in Powell et al. (2018) show that broad access to medical marijuana
facilitates marijuana acting as a substitute for opioids. Marijuana's ability to substitute
for strong and addictive opioids lies in the liberal allowances for dispensaries to provide
marijuana. Powell et al. (2018) nd that medical marijuana laws reduce both daily opioid
doses lled and opioid overdose deaths. Chan et al. (2020) further exhibits marijuana's ability
to act as a substitute for opioids. Results show large decreases in opioid mortality following
the introduction of medical marijuana dispensaries and further decreases after introducing
recreational marijuana dispensaries. Marijuana again appears as a substitute for opioids in
Livingston et al. (2017).
This paper extends upon this literature as it examines the impact of legalization of
recreational marijuana on the consumption of other legal goods at the individual level.
Previous studies have not focused on the variety of consumption behaviors studied here,
especially smokeless tobacco. Also, the focus on this paper is not the date of legalization,
but the date in which marijuana became available in the market. Looking at the introduction
of marijuana into the legal market, combined with using individual level data, allows the
relationship between marijuana and other legal good to be thoroughly explored. Using the
date marijuana enters the legal market follows Chan et al. (2020). Chan et al. (2020) nds
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no impacts on opioids following the passing of medical marijuana or recreational marijuana
laws. However, the signicance appears following dispensaries opening.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data Description
The data used in this paper comes from the 2010-2017 waves of the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is conducted annually to a randomly selected
sample of the population, providing a representative sample of the U.S. population. The
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, with assistance from state governments, conducts
the BRFSS by phone, including individuals over the age of 18 in each state in the U.S. The
BRFSS is rich with data for the individuals selected including personal characteristics such
as age, income, education, health status, family structure, and many other economic and
demographics characteristics. Table 3.1 reports the means of personal characteristics in legal,
liberalized, and all states.
The data includes risky behaviors in which individuals partake. The risky behaviors
include use of alcohol, cigarettes, and smokeless tobacco. An indicator variable for alcohol
use equals 1 if an individual consumed any alcohol in the last 30 days. Furthermore, data
includes how many days out of 30 that they consumed alcohol. In addition to use and
frequency of alcohol consumption, additional variables indicate binge drinking, the amount
of binge drinking, an indicator variable for drunk driving, and incidences of drunk driving.
Variables for tobacco include whether an individual is a smoker or user of smokeless tobacco,
and an indicator variable if individuals use it daily or not. An additional indicator variable
shows if an individual had made a serious attempt to quit smoking in the last 12 months.
It is worth noting that not all of the variables for risky behaviors are available in each
wave of the BRFSS. Data on drinking and driving is only available in the 2010, 2012, 2014,
and 2016 waves. Also, individuals taking this survey do not always answer the questions
regarding these risky behaviors, leading to incomplete data. However, the large amount
of observations included yields a representative sample. Ideally, the BRFSS would include
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information on marijuana use. While the survey includes a question regarding marijuana
use, the question appears sporadically. The data does not include enough information to
be useful in this study. Many states do not include any information nor does information
appear in each year of the BRFSS.
Descriptive Statistics are reported in Table 3.2, containing means for each outcome vari-
able in legal, liberalized, and all states. There are noticeable dierence between the means
of outcome variables in the treated and control groups. For instance, 58.6% of the treated
sample consumed alcohol, while the control group consumed at a rate of 49.8%. Also, the
amount of days consuming alcohol in the last 30 days was 4.518 days in legal states, and
3.423 in liberalized states. Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for legalizing states before
and after recreational marijuana was introduced into the market.
3.3.2 Methodology
A dierences-in-dierences approach examines the impact of the legalization of recre-
ational marijuana on individuals partaking in the risky behavior of other legal goods such
as alcohol and tobacco. The model estimated is dened by
Yismt = α0 + β1Legalizedst + β2Xit + τs + λm + γt + εist (3.1)
in which Yismt represents outcome variables including a variety of uses of alcohol and
tobacco. Legalizedst captures the period following the introduction of recreational marijuana
into the market indicating treatment. The coecient shows whether marijuana acts as a
substitute or complement for the good considered. Colorado, Washington (state), Oregon,
Nevada, and Washington D.C represent the treated group. States that pass laws to legalize
marijuana may not be considered treated. This is due to the time lag between passing a
legalization legislation and introducing recreational marijuana into the market. These states
include California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont.
Equation (1) includes a vector of individual characteristics (Xit). Variables include infor-
mation regarding individuals age, education, employment, household structure, and reported
health status. Household structure included whether the individual is married or not, as well
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as children in the household. Health status includes reported overall good health, as well as
the number of days in the past 30 days that an individual reported poor physical and mental
health.
To control for variation over time γt represents xed eects for year of the phone inter-
view conducted. Month xed eects, λm, control for variation of consumption of the goods
considered throughout the year. With dierent states having dierent laws regarding alco-
hol, along with social and political factors associated with marijuana legalization, state xed
eects are included, τs (Spetz et al., 2019).
State xed eects will not capture all of the social and political dierence between states
that legalize marijuana and those in which marijuana remains illegal. The control group
must be constructed to handle for the large potential large dierences between these states.
To do so, the control group is constructed of states that have liberalized marijuana through
legalizing medical use, or decriminalizing possession of marijuana. Overall, this excludes
13 contiguous states from the sample. The sample of legal, liberalized, and illegal states is
shown in Figure 3.1.5
A potential issue with the di-in-di strategy shown above is the possibility of an un-
balanced treatment and control group. To correct for this, entropy balancing is utilized to
balance the samples. Proposed by Hainmueller (2012), entropy balancing creates a nearly
identical control group to be compared to the treated group. Balancing is done by reweight-
ing scheme that calibrates unit weights. This technique is utilized by Grossman et al. (2019),
studying the impact of investments made by the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)
on ARC counties compared to non-ARC counties.
Individuals are balanced on multiple personal characteristics. These characteristics in-
clude: age, sex, marital status, employment, income, education, and the number of children
in the household. Table 3.4 shows entropy balancing using the full sample. Before entropy
balancing there exists a signicant dierence between the sample of legal and liberalized
states. The signicance disappears following entropy balancing. Due to inconsistency in
reporting of the behaviors studied, entropy balancing is conducted to balance legal and lib-
eralized states prior to analyzing each outcome considered. The tables showing the balancing
5The sample does not consider Alaska or Hawaii.
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process are not included here due to the large amount of extra tables that would need to be
included.
3.3.3 Results
The regression results for Equation (1) are shown in Table 3.5-3.10. Table 3.5 shows the
impact of legalization on overall use of alcohol. Columns 1-3 show the results considering any
consumption of alcohol, while columns 4-6 displays results on the number of days drinking
in the last 30 days. When controlling for reported health in column 3, a decrease in any
consumption of alcohol appears signicant. In each regression using the number of days
drinking, a decrease in the number of day drinking is found to be signicant. These results
indicate that marijuana acts as a subsitute for alcohol. Introducing recreational marijuana
into the market leads to a decrease in alcohol consumption. Considering Colorado after
legalization, the Colorado Department of Revenue reported fewer gallons of alcohol sold in
2015 than in 2014. A decrease occurs again in 2016 compared to 2015.
Further considering the amount of alcohol consumed, Table 3.6 reports results on the
maximum number of alcoholic beverages consumed in a sitting. When controlling for ed-
ucation, employment status, and measures of health the maximum number of drinks in a
sitting decreases signicantly. Table 3.7 shows the results of the impact of legalization on
binge drinking, with no signicant impact being found.
Table 3.8 shows the result of possibly the riskiest behavior studied, drinking and driving.
Columns 1-3 show any occurrence of drinking and driving in the last 30 days, and columns 4-
6 shows the number of incidence of drinking and driving reported. Across each specication,
it is found that drinking and driving decreases due to legalization. Using Colorado as an
example, according to the Colorado Task Force on Drunk & Impaired Driving, the number
of fatal crashes increased from 407 in 2011 to 558 in 2016. However, while fatal crashes have
increased, the number of fatal crashes in which a BAC of 0.08 or higher was reported only
increased from 160 in 2011 to 161 in 2016. A limitation of this paper is the inability to
directly examine the consumption of marijuana. Thus, marijuana-related trac accidents
substituting for alcohol-related trac accidents represents a potential concern. Hansen et al.
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(2020) partially mitigates this concern, as ndings indicate no dierence between trac
fatalities involving marijuana following legalization.
Results show that marijuana acts as a substitute for alcohol, but what about tobacco
products? Legalization and its impact on tobacco products are reported in Tables 3.9 and
3.10. Table 3.9 examines cigarette smoking (columns 1-3) and the use of smokeless tobacco
(columns 4-6). Legalization appears to not have an impact on smoking cigarettes, but across
all specications a signicant decrease in the use of smokeless tobacco appears. Table 3.10
further shows a decrease in the use of smokeless tobacco, nding that individuals in legalized
states are less likely to be daily users of smokeless tobacco. While marijuana does not appear
to substitute nor complement cigarettes, results show marijuana and smokeless tobacco to
be substitutes.
3.3.4 Falsication Test
Utilizing the same approach considering failed recreational marijuana votes serves as a
falsication test. State with failed votes will represent the treated group". In November
2015, voting in Ohio included a measure to legalize recreational marijuana. The vote to
legalize recreational marijuana in Ohio failed with 63.65% voting no. In Arizona, 51.32%
voted no causing a vote to legalize marijuana to fail in 2016. These failed votes provide a
setting to use as a falsication test.6
Ohio and Arizona are compared to other states that have liberalized marijuana. Legal
marijuana states and states in which no marijuana liberalization has occurred are excluded
from the sample. Table 3.11 presents the results of the falsication test. Results clearly
illustrate that no signicant changes occurred following a failed vote to legalize marijuana.
This strengthens the results reported above showing that marijuana acts as a substitute,
lessening risky behaviors involving alcohol and tobacco.
While Arizona passed medical marijuana laws in the 1990s, Ohio recently passed a med-
ical marijuana law in 2016. However, the rst license to sale medical marijuana was not
issued until 2019. Considering the results found by Chan et al. (2020), the results of this
6Information on voting outcomes are obtained from Ballotpedia.
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falsication are not surprising. Chan et al. (2020) nds that eects do not appear until
marijuana laws are implemented, not when the law itself passes.
3.3.5 Mechanisms
Two primary mechanisms drive the results presented in this paper. First, the increased
availability of marijuana causes marijuana to more easily be substituted for other legal
goods. While marijuana use occurs in states without legalization, being able to easily access
marijuana makes substitution much easier. When illegal, consuming marijuana involves
explicitly breaking the law. Without this legal barrier, individuals wanting to consume
marijuana are able to do so without fear of legal consequences.
There also exists a negative stigma from consuming marijuana when illegal (Brown,
2015). Marijuana becoming legal potentially lessens the stigma associated with consumption,
increasing demand. With the stigma lessened and availability increased, marijuana appears
to become a competitor for alcohol and smokeless tobacco. These mechanisms explain why
marijuana appears to act as a substitute when introduced into the legal market.
3.4 Policy Implications
The legalization of marijuana is a much debated topic. Overall, the results support
legalizing recreational marijuana, showing that the consumption of other legal, potentially
risky goods decrease as a result of legalization. To further consider the potential benets of
legalizing, tax revenues generated from legalizing can be incredibly large.
Marijuana is a heavily taxed good with a large market. In 2017, the state of Colorado
received nearly $225 million in tax revenues. The tax revenues have grown every year since
legalization occurred, indicating a growing market for legal, recreational marijuana. Mar-
ijuana became subjected to a 15% recreational marijuana sales tax and a 15% excise tax
starting in 2017. Before 2017, marijuana was subject to 2.9% sales tax, a 10% recreational
marijuana sales tax and a 15% excise tax.7 These high tax rates are not exclusive to Col-
7Marijuana tax information for Colorado was retreived from https://www.colorado.gov/pacic/revenue/colorado-
marijuana-tax-data
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orado. As of January 2018, marijuana had a 37% sales tax in Washington, 17% in Oregon,
and 15% excise and 10% sales tax in Nevada for example.8
A potential issue with marijuana taxes is the cannibalization of tax revenues from tobacco
and alcohol. However, looking at tax revenues in Colorado, tobacco has decreased, but only
by $7,000,000, and taxed 2 million fewer packs of cigarettes from 2014 to 2017. This is much
less than the tax revenues gained from marijuana.9 Alcohol tax revenue in Colorado increase
by around $1,500,000 in the same timeframe.10 Cannibalization of tax revenues does not
appear to be a concern, at least in Colorado. While tobacco experiences a small decrease
and alcohol tax revenue increases, in the same time period marijuana tax revenue increased
from $35 million to nearly $225 million.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of the legalization of marijuana on other risky behaviors
that are legal for individuals to engage in. To test the impact, data from the BRFSS
is used for di-in-di using entropy balancing. Overall, it is found that the legalization
of recreational marijuana can signicantly reduce other risky behaviors involving the use of
other legal substances, suggesting the substituting relationship between marijuana and other
legal goods potentially risky to consume.
Individuals subject to legalization are less likely to consume alcohol and smokeless to-
bacco. Further analyzing abusive alcohol behaviors, it is found that the maximum number
of alcoholic beverages consumed in one sitting decreases, as well as drinking and driving.
Overall, results indicate that the legalization of recreational marijuana can weed out risky
behaviors involving the consumption of alcohol and smokeless tobacco, supporting marijuana
legalization. Using failed recreational marijuana votes held in Ohio and Arizona, results are
shown to hold up to a falsication test.
8General marijuana tax information comes from https://taxfoundation.org/state-marijuana-taxes-2018/
9https://www.colorado.gov/pacic/revenue/annual-report
10https://www.colorado.gov/pacic/revenue/colorado-liquor-excise-taxes
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Figure 3.1: Legalization of Recreational Marijuana By State
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Means of Characteristics in Legal and Liberalized States
Liberalized Legal Total
Children in Household 0.516 0.497 0.511
Age 55.66 54.99 55.47
Male 0.410 0.423 0.414
Married 0.532 0.517 0.527
Good health 0.806 0.833 0.814
Days with Bad Physical Health 4.384 4.173 4.324
Days with Bad Mental Health 3.440 3.466 3.447
Employed 0.411 0.413 0.411
Self-employed 0.082 0.093 0.085
Out of work > 1 year 0.028 0.032 0.029
Out of work < 1 year 0.024 0.027 0.025
Homemaker 0.063 0.060 0.062
Student 0.023 0.025 0.023
Retired 0.297 0.285 0.293
Unable to Work 0.073 0.065 0.071
Did not graduate HS 0.083 0.070 0.080
Graduated HS 0.297 0.247 0.283
Attended college or technical school 0.272 0.270 0.271
Graduated college or technical school 0.348 0.413 0.366
Less than $10,000 0.052 0.051 0.052
$10,000 to $14,999 0.059 0.055 0.058
$15,000 to $19,999 0.081 0.069 0.077
$20,000 to $24,999 0.099 0.087 0.095
$25,000 to $34,999 0.114 0.107 0.112
$35,000 to $49,999 0.146 0.142 0.145
$50,000 to $74,999 0.157 0.161 0.158
$75,000 or more 0.292 0.329 0.303
Observations 2,697,117
Means reported
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Means of Behaviors in Legal and Liberalized States
Liberalized Legal Total
Any drinking in the last 30 days 0.498 0.586 0.523
Number of days drinking in the last 30 days 3.423 4.518 3.731
Maximum number of drinks in a sitting in the last 30 days 3.194 3.056 3.150
Any binge drinking in the last 30 days 0.122 0.135 0.126
Number of days binge drinking in the last 30 days 1.053 0.959 1.024
Any drinking and driving in the past 30 days 0.028 0.032 0.029
Incidence of drinking and driving in the past 30 days 0.070 0.105 0.081
Smoker 0.156 0.142 0.152
Daily Smoker 0.113 0.100 0.109
Serious attempt to quit smoking in the last 12 months 0.569 0.572 0.569
User of Smokeless Tobacco 0.032 0.021 0.029
Daily user of smokeless tobacco 0.018 0.011 0.016
Observations 2,633,735
Means reported
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Means of Behaviors in Legal States Before and After Imple-
mentation of Recreational Marijuana
Pre-legalization Post-legalization Total
Any drinking in the last 30 days 0.584 0.595 0.586
Number of days drinking in the last 30 days 4.489 4.657 4.518
Maximum number of drinks in a sitting in the last 30 days 3.071 2.981 3.056
Any binge drinking in the last 30 days 0.135 0.134 0.135
Number of days binge drinking in the last 30 days 0.964 0.932 0.959
Any drinking and driving in the past 30 days 0.033 0.029 0.032
Incidence of drinking and driving in the past 30 days 0.113 0.059 0.105
Smoker 0.144 0.127 0.142
Daily Smoker 0.103 0.086 0.100
Serious attempt to quit smoking in the last 12 months 0.572 0.567 0.572
User of Smokeless Tobacco 0.020 0.027 0.021
Daily user of smokeless tobacco 0.010 0.015 0.011
Observations 742,206
Means reported
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 3. Can Legalization Weed" Out Risky Behaviors? 76
Table 3.4: Entropy Balancing: Means of Characteristics in Legal and Liberalized States
Not Balanced Entropy Balanced
Legal States Liberalized States Legal States Liberalized States
Children in household 0.5252 0.5478∗ 0.5252 0.5252
Age 54.73 55.15∗ 54.73 54.73
Male 0.4325 0.4229∗ 0.4325 0.4325
Married 0.528 0.5406∗ 0.528 0.528
Self-employed 0.09522 0.08466∗ 0.09522 0.09522
Out of Work > 1 year 0.03113 0.02721∗ 0.03113 0.03113
Out of Work < 1 year 0.02655 0.02402∗ 0.02655 0.02655
Homemaker 0.05582 0.05757∗ 0.05582 0.05582
Student 0.02304 0.02029∗ 0.02304 0.02304
Retired 0.2716 0.2797∗ 0.2716 0.2716
Unable to work 0.06304 0.07202∗ 0.06304 0.06304
Graduated HS 0.2396 0.2906∗ 0.2396 0.2396
Attended college or technical school 0.2714 0.274∗ 0.2714 0.2714
Graduated college or technical school 0.4224 0.3577∗ 0.4224 0.4224
$10,000 to $14,999 0.05555 0.05902∗ 0.05555 0.05555
$15,000 to $19,999 0.06868 0.08118∗ 0.06868 0.06868
$12,000 to $24,999 0.08625 0.09915∗ 0.08625 0.08626
$25,000 to $34,999 0.1073 0.1153∗ 0.1073 0.1073
$35,000 to $49,999 0.1435 0.1468∗ 0.1435 0.1435
$50,000 to $74,999 0.1612 0.1577∗ 0.1612 0.1612
$75,000 or more 0.3265 0.289∗ 0.3265 0.3265
Observations 418,645 1,022,427
Means reported
∗ indicates signicant dierences between the means in legal states and liberalized states.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results: Overall Alcohol Use
Any drinking in the last 30 days Days drinking in the last 30 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legalized -0.00484 -0.00479 -0.00519∗ -0.145∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(-1.80) (-1.85) (-1.99) (-3.18) (-3.45) (-3.64)
Children in Household -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗
(-62.04) (-49.97) (-49.48) (-54.23) (-48.35) (-47.80)
Age -0.00449∗∗∗ -0.00343∗∗∗ -0.00310∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
(-149.34) (-90.57) (-80.01) (24.36) (18.61) (25.26)
Male 0.0985∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗ 1.942∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗
(107.55) (86.77) (87.59) (126.19) (115.48) (116.62)
Married 0.0883∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗
(94.70) (-21.71) (-20.82) (47.85) (-14.29) (-12.77)
Good health 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(54.68) (32.87)
Days with Bad Mental Health 0.00180∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗
(28.32) (39.26)
Days with Bad Physical Health -0.00241∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗
(-37.11) (-16.83)
Constant 0.720∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 4.766∗∗∗ 2.824∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗
(187.55) (106.22) (86.92) (74.86) (38.09) (24.88)
Year, month xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State xed eect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Employment and education controls N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 1394197 1394197 1355916 1255443 1255443 1222930
R2 0.063 0.139 0.143 0.047 0.072 0.075
T-stats in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome mean in full sample: Any drinking=0.523, Number of days drinking=3.731
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Table 3.6: Regression Results: Maximum Number of Drinks
Maximum number of drinks in a sitting
(1) (2) (3)
Legalized -0.0295 -0.0385∗ -0.0400∗
(-1.61) (-2.11) (-2.18)
Children in Household -0.117∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(-23.71) (-26.47) (-26.62)
Age -0.0553∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0571∗∗∗
(-200.62) (-161.76) (-157.70)
Male 1.505∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗ 1.477∗∗∗
(213.81) (207.14) (206.39)




Days with Bad Mental Health 0.0216∗∗∗
(30.10)
Days with Bad Physical Health -0.00178∗∗
(-2.73)
Constant 5.678∗∗∗ 6.732∗∗∗ 6.608∗∗∗
(186.74) (128.64) (118.99)
Year, month xed eects Y Y Y
State xed eect Y Y Y
Employment and education controls N Y Y
Observations 731091 731091 717757
R2 0.158 0.167 0.170
T-stats in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome mean in full sample: Maximum amount drank in a sitting=3.150
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Table 3.7: Regression Results: Binge Drinking
Any binge drinking in the last 30 days Days binge drinking in the last 30 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legalized 0.00185 0.00125 0.000538 -0.00825 -0.0143 -0.0221
(0.97) (0.66) (0.28) (-0.35) (-0.60) (-0.93)
Children in Household -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(-46.92) (-45.83) (-45.64) (-18.22) (-20.69) (-20.76)
Age -0.00542∗∗∗ -0.00539∗∗∗ -0.00531∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗∗
(-234.27) (-180.08) (-173.62) (-90.81) (-73.70) (-70.17)
Male 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0797∗∗∗ 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(127.69) (116.33) (117.02) (93.01) (87.94) (89.14)
Married -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗
(-35.68) (-58.83) (-56.94) (-54.38) (-38.77) (-36.49)
Good health 0.0132∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(13.57) (-9.77)
Days with Bad Mental Health 0.00162∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(34.14) (32.18)
Days with Bad Physical Health -0.000560∗∗∗ -0.000356
(-13.52) (-0.41)
Constant 0.405∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 2.312∗∗∗ 3.376∗∗∗ 3.255∗∗∗
(149.94) (123.58) (111.51) (63.94) (55.41) (50.32)
Year, month xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State xed eect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Employment and education controls N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 1383396 1383396 1346067 743565 743565 729864
R2 0.082 0.088 0.089 0.035 0.045 0.049
T-stats in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome mean in full sample: Any binge drinking=0.126, Number of days binge drinking=1.024
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Table 3.8: Regression Results: Drinking and Driving
Any drinking and driving in the last 30 days Incidence of drinking and driving in the last 30 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legalized -0.00702∗∗∗ -0.00713∗∗∗ -0.00732∗∗∗ -0.0765∗∗∗ -0.0772∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗
(-4.15) (-4.22) (-4.28) (-10.44) (-10.52) (-10.44)
Children in Household -0.00315∗∗∗ -0.00340∗∗∗ -0.00340∗∗∗ 0.00203 -0.000138 -0.0000830
(-8.94) (-9.49) (-9.43) (0.75) (-0.05) (-0.03)
Age -0.000810∗∗∗ -0.000771∗∗∗ -0.000723∗∗∗ -0.00160∗∗∗ -0.00172∗∗∗ -0.00153∗∗∗
(-39.07) (-28.19) (-26.09) (-13.17) (-10.41) (-9.14)
Male 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗
(46.18) (43.77) (44.38) (26.83) (25.34) (25.35)
Married -0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ -0.0492∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗
(-25.62) (-27.05) (-26.28) (-16.73) (-13.96) (-13.37)
Good health -0.000312 -0.0197∗∗
(-0.28) (-2.71)
Days with Bad Mental Health 0.000921∗∗∗ 0.00384∗∗∗
(18.20) (10.25)
Days with Bad Physical Health -0.000148∗∗ -0.000243
(-3.23) (-0.77)
Constant 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(25.37) (17.67) (14.45) (7.02) (9.14) (7.86)
Year, month xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State xed eect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Employment and education controls N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 452834 452834 444182 452834 452834 444182
R2 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.011 0.012 0.013
T-stats in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome mean in full sample: Any drinking and driving=0.028, Incidence of drinking and driving=0.070
Candon R. Johnson Chapter 3. Can Legalization Weed" Out Risky Behaviors? 81
Table 3.9: Regression Results: Tobacco Use
Smoke cigarettes Use smokeless tobacco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legalized -0.00101 -0.00160 -0.00120 -0.00436∗∗∗ -0.00457∗∗∗ -0.00473∗∗∗
(-0.54) (-0.88) (-0.65) (-4.88) (-5.13) (-5.25)
Children in Household -0.00357∗∗∗ -0.00676∗∗∗ -0.00636∗∗∗ 0.000929∗∗∗ 0.000481∗∗ 0.000495∗∗
(-9.52) (-18.22) (-17.13) (5.12) (2.58) (2.63)
Age -0.00262∗∗∗ -0.00288∗∗∗ -0.00264∗∗∗ -0.000666∗∗∗ -0.000738∗∗∗ -0.000743∗∗∗
(-123.74) (-102.39) (-92.98) (-63.57) (-54.15) (-53.51)
Male 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗
(39.20) (43.18) (47.23) (146.12) (143.40) (141.80)
Married -0.0987∗∗∗ -0.0515∗∗∗ -0.0497∗∗∗ -0.00854∗∗∗ -0.00679∗∗∗ -0.00676∗∗∗
(-145.54) (-69.61) (-66.50) (-29.66) (-20.33) (-19.99)
Good health -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.00114∗
(-16.83) (-2.28)
Days with Bad Mental Health 0.00413∗∗∗ 0.000118∗∗∗
(73.33) (5.30)
Days with Bad Physical Health 0.000510∗∗∗ 0.0000352
(9.80) (1.65)
Constant 0.343∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗
(126.99) (129.15) (116.49) (36.84) (41.24) (39.10)
Year, month xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State xed eect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Employment and education controls N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 1419241 1419241 1379606 1423058 1423058 1383113
R2 0.039 0.091 0.100 0.032 0.036 0.036
T-stats in parentheses
Robust Standard Errors
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Outcome mean in full sample: Smoke=0.156, Use smokeless tobacco=0.032
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Table 3.11: Falsication Check: Failed Recreational Marijuana Votes
Outcome Treated" Coecient Observations
Any drinking in the last 30 days -0.00835 963,310
(-1.34)
Number of days drinking in the last 30 days -0.0702 866,014
(-0.76)
Maximum number of drinks in a sitting in the last 30 days 0.0170 486,145
(0.26)
Any binge drinking in the last 30 days -0.00503 956,195
(-1.22)
Number of days binge drinking in the last 30 days -0.0483 495,156
(-0.70)
Any drinking and driving in the past 30 days 0.00199 301,427
(0.44)




Daily Smoker 0.00153 980,974
(0.37)
Serious attempt to quit smoking in the last 12 months -0.0243 159,843
(-1.50)
User of Smokeless Tobacco -0.000298 978,636
(-0.13)
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4.1 Appendices to Chapter 1
4.1.1 Synthetic Control Results with One Employment Growth Lag
Kaul et al. (2015) warn against using all past values of the outcome variable as this
results in all other predictors having no contributing weight. Kaul et al. (2015) recommends
using one lag for the outcome variable, selecting the year prior to treatment. Results shown
in Section 4 select three years of employment growth before treatment occurs. This approach
follows Islam (2019).
Table 4.1 reports pre-treatment RMSPE for each Olympic hosting county using one lag
of employment growth the year prior to hosting and three lags of employment growth as seen
in Islam (2019). In each county using three years of employment growth generated a lower
RMSPE in each Olympics, indicating a better t. Figure 4.1 show synthetic control results
using one year of employment growth, average population growth, and average income growth
to create the synthetic county. For each Olympic Games study, results remain consistent.
Examining Figure 4.2 Los Angeles County appears to experience a reduction in employ-
ment growth in 1982. While this impact appears less signicant than seen in Figure 1.2, the
lower pre-treatment RMSPE makes results presented in Section 4.2 preferable. Results seen
in Section 4.2 for Fulton County and Salt Lak County remain in Figure 4.2. Fulton County
experiences an increase in employment growth in 1993, 1994, and 1996. Salt Lake County
experiences an increase in 1996.
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Table 4.1: Pre-treatment RMSPE: One Lag of Employment Growth vs Three Lags of Em-
ployment Growth
County One Lag of Employment Growth Three Lags of Employment Growth
Los Angeles County 0.0076 0.004
Fulton County 0.0142 0.0139
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2002 Winter Olympic Games: One Lag of Employment Growth
Figure 4.1: Synthetic Control Results: One Lag of Employment Growth
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2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake County, UT: One Lag of Employment Growth
Figure 4.2: Placebo Tests: One Lag of Employment Growth
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4.1.2 Placebo Tests Dropping Donor Counties with High MSPE
The following Figures present placebo tests dropping placebo counties that were poor
pre-treatment ts, measured by MSPE, as in Abadie et al. (2010). Excluding poor tting
placebo counties highlights years in which an increase in employment growth is experienced.
Placebo tests are presented dropping placebos with MSPE two times, ve times, and twenty
times higher for Los Angeles County. 1982 represents a signicant decrease in employment
growth from the Olympics in Los Angeles County. When dropping counties with MSPE ve
times higher and two times higher, Los Angeles County appears to experience a decrease in
employment growth in 1980 as well. For Fulton County placebos with MSPE two times and
ve times higher are dropped, while placebos with MSPE two times higher are dropped for
Salt Lake County. Results remain the same for Fulton County and Salt Lake County when
dropping poorly t counties. Fulton County experiences an increase in growth in 1993, 1994,
and 1996. An increase in growth in Salt Lake County occurs in 1996, the year following
being awarded the Olympic Games.
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Figure 4.3: Placebo Tests: Los Angeles County Dropping Counties with MSPE Two Times
as High
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Figure 4.4: Placebo Tests: Los Angeles County Dropping Counties with MSPE Five Times
as High
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Figure 4.5: Placebo Tests: Los Angeles County Dropping Counties with MSPE Twenty
Times as High
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Figure 4.6: Placebo Tests: Fulton County Dropping Counties with MSPE Two Times as
High
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Figure 4.7: Placebo Tests: Fulton County Dropping Counties with MSPE Five Times as
High
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Figure 4.8: Placebo Tests: Salt Lake County Dropping Counties with MSPE Two Times as
High
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4.1.3 Spillover Eects: State-level Synthetic Control Analysis
While this paper studies of the county which represents the focal point of each Olympic
Games studied, various counties in the hosting state held events. For example, the sailing
events in the 1996 Olympic Games took place over three hours from Atlanta, GA in Savannah,
GA. Considering the size of the event that the Olympics represents and events being held
throughout Olympic hosting states, analyzing spillover eects becomes important. The
following gures posits two approaches to test for spillover eects. The rst approach, seen
in Figures 18 and 19, analyzes the host state in its entirety, including the host county. The
second approach (Figures 20 and 21) uses the synthetic control approach on host states
excluding the host county. Deducting the host county from the state mitigates concern
of state-level results being driven by the host county. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 presents synthetic
weight for each approach. For each state, a portion of the synthetic counterpart is comprised
of similar states regardless of the approach used. Results show no clear, signicant spillover
eects experienced in either California or Utah. However, the positive impact felt from the
lead up to the 1996 Olympic Games appears to have been felt throughout Georgia.
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Table 4.2: Synthetic Control Weights: State-Level Analysis Including Host County
Donor California Georgia Utah
State Weights Weights Weights
Connecticut 0.448  
Delaware 0.004  
Florida  0.332 
Idaho 0.17  
Michigan  0.261 
Nevada 0.125  0.397
New Hampshire  0.306 
New Jersey   0.259
Rhode Island  0.101 
South Dakota   0.118
Washington 0.248  
Wyoming   0.226
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Table 4.3: Synthetic Control Weights: State-Level Analysis Excluding Host County
Donor California Georgia Utah
State Weights Weights Weights
Arizona  0.086 0.189
Connecticut 0.271  
Florida  0.256 
Idaho 0.327  
Michigan  0.184 
Nevada 0.131  0.411
New Hampshire  0.223 
South Dakota   0.4
Virginia  0.25 
Washington 0.158  
Wyoming 0.113  
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Figure 4.9: State-level Synthetic Control Results
The solid line indicates employment growth rates experienced in host states, while the dashed
line represents their synthetic counterpart.
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Figure 4.10: State-level Placebo Tests
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Figure 4.11: State-level Synthetic Control Results Excluding Olympic Host County
The solid line indicates employment growth rates experienced in host states, while the dashed
line represents their synthetic counterpart.
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Figure 4.12: State-level Placebo Tests Excluding Olympic Host County
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4.2 Appendices to Chapter 2
4.2.1 Results with Max Contracts
Table 4.4: Pooled Twofold Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: With Max Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-black 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗ 15.07∗∗∗
(205.79) (204.00) (205.85) (204.59)
Black 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗ 14.86∗∗∗
(363.16) (361.76) (363.08) (361.77)
Dierence 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(2.44) (2.42) (2.44) (2.43)
Explained 0.0925 0.0806 0.0910 0.0766
(1.17) (1.06) (1.15) (1.00)
Unexplained 0.112∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(2.34) (2.07) (2.37) (2.14)
Observations 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
Position and year xed eects included
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Weighted Least Squares Regression Results: With Max Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salary Salary Salary Salary
Age 1.574∗∗ 3.246∗∗∗ 1.579∗∗ 3.246∗∗∗
(2.24) (4.18) (2.26) (4.21)
Age2 -0.259∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗
(-2.15) (-4.07) (-2.17) (-4.11)
Multi-year Contract 0.400∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗
(7.99) (10.06) (7.99) (10.15)
Foreign-Born  No College 0.00988 0.0701 0.0151 0.0791
(0.15) (0.88) (0.22) (0.98)
Foreign-Born  College 0.120 0.0470 0.117 0.0383
(1.46) (0.43) (1.43) (0.36)
Restricted Free Agent 0.292∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
(4.91) (5.75) (4.92) (5.75)
Max Contract 0.487∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(5.90) (6.46) (5.95) (6.59)
Games Played 0.00167 0.00163
(1.24) (1.22)
% of Games Started -0.0390 0.564∗∗∗ -0.0336 0.568∗∗∗
(-0.43) (7.35) (-0.37) (7.40)
Field Goal Percentage 0.163 0.160
(0.54) (0.53)
Previous Team Win % 0.812∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗
(5.48) (1.97) (5.55) (2.12)
Signing Team Win % -0.750∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.751∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗
(-4.28) (-3.50) (-4.25) (-3.39)
Re-sign 0.148∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(3.18) (2.62) (3.17) (2.59)
Draft Position -0.000703 -0.00680∗∗∗ -0.000728 -0.00681∗∗∗
(-0.66) (-6.23) (-0.69) (-6.24)
Height in Inches 0.0178 -0.00186 0.0169 -0.00444
(1.34) (-0.13) (1.28) (-0.31)
Head Coach is Black -0.0329 -0.0143 -0.0462 -0.0477
(-0.51) (-0.20) (-0.68) (-0.63)
GM is Black -0.0633 -0.0992 -0.0509 -0.0813
(-0.80) (-1.05) (-0.62) (-0.83)
Black -0.112∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.128∗∗
(-2.24) (-1.98) (-2.26) (-2.03)
VORP 0.262∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
(10.64) (10.54)
Population (000,000s) -0.0935 -0.00587
(-0.39) (-0.02)
White Population 0.0251 0.0559∗
(0.89) (1.65)
Position & Year Fixed eects Y Y Y Y
Observations 797 797 797 797
R2 0.774 0.708 0.774 0.710
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.2.2 Data Sources
The data used in this paper comes from a variety of sources. Salary and contract in-
formation was obtained from Spotrac.com. This includes variables used such as average
salary value, length of contract, restricted free agency status, re-signing, and the number of
contracts signed in our sample period. Realgm.com provides every NBA draft since 1947,
oering information on each draft eligible player. Information relevant to this paper from
realgm.com includes the player's height, draft position, place of birth, and college experience
(or lack thereof). Player's place of birth and college experience are then used to create the
indicator variables Foreign-Born  No College" and Foreign-Born  College".
Performance statistics for both team and player retrieved from basketball-reference.com
includes each per game statistic, games played, games started, and team winning percent-
ages. Basketball-reference.com also provides player age. VORP, the only performance statis-
tic not taken from basketball-reference.com, was obtained from boxscoregeeks.com. The race
of players, coaches, and general managers were determined using pictures from various web-
sites. Pictures for players appear on NBA.com (the ocial NBA website) and basketball-
reference.com. Coach and general manager pictures come from a wide variety of websites.
In addition to NBA.com and basketball-reference.com, news websites such as USAtoday.com
provide pictures.
Final data collected includes population characteristics. These were largely obtained
from the American Community Survey through census.gov. This data included population
counts, as well as the percentage of the population that is white. The American Community
Survey provided population characteristics for all but one NBA team, the Toronto Raptors.
Due to the Toronto Raptors playing in Canada, population characteristics for Toronto comes
from statcan.gc.ca. The following table summarizes variables used and their sources.
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Table 4.6: Sources Used to Retrieve Variables
Variable Source
Avg Salary Spotrac.com
Player is Black NBA.com and Basketball-reference.com
Foreign-Born  No College Realgm.com
Foreign-Born  College Realgm.com
Age Basketball-reference.com
Games Played Basketball-reference.com
% of Games Started Basketball-reference.com
Minutes Played Per Game Basketball-reference.com
Points Per Game Basketball-reference.com
Rebounds Per Game Basketball-reference.com
Assists Per Game Basketball-reference.com
Blocks Per Game Basketball-reference.com
Steals Per Game Basketball-reference.com
VORP Boxscoregeeks.com
Previous Team Win % Basketball-reference.com
Signing Team Win % Basketball-reference.com
Re-sign Realgm.com
Height in Inches Realgm.com
Draft Position Realgm.com
Head Coach is Black Various websites/news articles
GM is Black Various websites/news articles
Population Census.gov and Statcan.gc.ca
White Population Census.gov and Statcan.gc.ca
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